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1 
DOING MORE FOR CHILDREN WITH LESS:  
MULTIDISCIPLINARY REPRESENTATION OF 
POOR CHILDREN IN FAMILY COURT AND 
PROBATE COURT 
Robert N. Jacobs* & Christina Riehl**† 
          Family court and probate court are Barmecide feasts for too 
many children, especially poor children with special needs. 
“Multidisciplinary representation” of children enables the courts to 
address needs and risks that cannot be resolved by fine-tuning a 
custody schedule, frequently at little or no additional cost to the 
taxpayers. Since most children cannot identify the salient issues in their 
cases and do not have standing in family court or probate court much 
less lawyers to represent them, it becomes the court’s responsibility in 
every case to identify the issues most relevant to children’s interests 
and decide whether multidisciplinary representation is indispensable to 
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justice. 
 
[S]he reminded him of the barefoot boy in the thin shirt and thin, 
tattered trousers and of all the shivering, stupefying misery in a 
world that never yet had provided enough heat and food and 
justice for all but an ingenious and unscrupulous handful. What a 
lousy earth! He wondered how many People were destitute that 
same night even in his own prosperous country, how many homes 
were shanties, how many husbands were drunk and wives socked, 
and how many children were bullied, abused or abandoned. How 
many families hungered for food they could not afford to buy? 
How many hearts were broken? How many suicides would take 
place that same night, how many people would go insane? How 
many cockroaches and landlords would triumph? How many 
winners were losers, successes failures, rich men poor men? How 
many wise guys were stupid? How many happy endings were 
unhappy endings? How many honest men were liars, brave men 
cowards, loyal men traitors, how many sainted men were corrupt, 
how many people in positions of trust had sold their souls to 
blackguards for petty cash, how many had never had souls? How 
many straight-and-narrow paths were crooked paths? How many 
best families were worst families and how many good people were 
bad people? When you added them all up and then subtracted, you 
might be left with only the children, and perhaps with Albert 
Einstein and an old violinist or sculptor somewhere.1 
 
  
 
 1. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 41213 (Simon & Schuster, 50th Anniversary ed. 2011). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article proposes a series of postulates to help resolve some 
of the stupefying misery that routinely attends children’s custody 
cases in family and probate courts in this era of low wages, tough 
neighborhoods, straitened court budgets, and no standing for 
children.2 
The postulates are that when custody is at issue, children’s goals 
are always the same: to be safe, healthy, and happy; to get what they 
need to make the most of themselves; and to have the best possible 
relationship with both parents. Sometimes these goals require more 
from the court than a custody-and-visitation schedule. Some children 
need lawyers to have any chance to accomplish these goals. When 
necessary, children’s lawyers should work with other professionals 
and community members to provide multidisciplinary representation. 
And children’s advocates must do more than go through the motions, 
since illusory representation accomplishes nothing. Existing law 
makes it possible to do much more for children with less. 
This Article derives these postulates from a discussion of seven 
cases3 on one lawyer’s docket in Los Angeles County in 2014 and 
2015. Offering more than anecdotal evidence, case studies can be the 
best way to evaluate a system.4 The cases discussed below explain 
how family and probate courts work, do not work, and could work 
for children—particularly poor children. 
Part II, “Some Children Need Effective Lawyers,” explains why 
some children need lawyers to accomplish their goals in custody 
cases. No one has more at stake when custody is at issue, and no one 
has less access to justice, because children cannot represent 
themselves as a matter of law. Part III, “Multidisciplinary 
 
 2. See infra notes 5, 49. 
 3. The authors selected these cases not because they are extraordinary, but because they 
illustrate recurring issues. The cases are organized into categories that are somewhat arbitrary, 
since most of the cases illustrate more than one issue and thus could easily fit into more than one 
category. In deference to section 7643 of the California Family Code, section 827 of the 
California Welfare and Institutions Code, the parties’ interest in privacy, and the court’s 
suggestion in Conservatorship of Schaeffer, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (Ct. App. 2002), that probate 
pleadings containing sensitive information be disclosed only to the parties, this Article uses 
pseudonyms for all parents and children and does not cite documents in any court file. 
 4. See Oliver Sacks, The Mind of AR Luria, 89 THE LISTENER 87073 (1973) (elucidating 
how case studies can isolate the contributing factors behind the situation at hand). See generally 
ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2005) (analyzing research methods using case studies and arguing that 
case studies complement quantitative research and formal models). 
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Representation: The Missing Link,” explains why children and their 
lawyers must work with social science professionals, collateral 
relatives, and the community to address complex parenting 
pathologies, some of which have roots that date back generations. 
Multidisciplinary representation can be the missing link between 
children and justice in family court and probate court. Part IV, “A 
Life in the Balance,” shows that illusory representation and kabuki 
hearings are pointless. This Part discusses the unfolding case of a 
teenager who has lived on Death Alley in south Los Angeles since 
the court placed him there when he was nine days old. Part V, 
“Family Code § 3153: A Partial Answer to Limited Scope 
Representation and the § 2030 Conundrum,” explains how the courts 
could do more for poor kids at little or no additional cost to the 
taxpayers. 
Part VI concludes that since children can neither represent 
themselves nor be expected to identify the salient issues in their 
cases, it becomes the trial court’s responsibility in every case to 
identify the critical issues and use triage principles to decide whether 
multidisciplinary representation is indispensable to justice. 
II.  SOME CHILDREN NEED EFFECTIVE LAWYERS 
A.  Children Cannot Represent Themselves 
Because children cannot represent themselves as a matter of 
law,5 no one has less access to justice than children without lawyers 
at ground zero of custody disputes in family6 or probate court.7 
 
 5. Children cannot appear in court because they lack “legal capacity to make decisions.” 
Family courts and probate courts almost never appoint guardians ad litem for children, partly 
because they generally do not have standing. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372(a) (West 2015); CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West 2003); J.W. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 527, 533 (Ct. 
App. 1993). See infra note 49 for an explanation of children’s standing when custody is at issue 
in family court and probate court. As a practical matter, most children could not represent 
themselves even if the law permitted them to do so because they do not understand what is going 
on in court. Cf. Leslie E. Shear, Dude I’m 14 Years Old and I’m Here to Address The Court . . . 
Now What? California Prepares for Teenagers in Family Court, 4 INT’L ACAD. MATRIM. L.J. 1 
(2011) (discussing the practical questions that may arise when children are allowed to actively 
participate in custody proceedings). 
 6. “‘Family court’ refers to one or more superior court judicial officers who handle 
litigation arising under the Family Code. It is not a separate court with special jurisdiction, but is 
instead the superior court performing one of its general duties.” In re Chantal S., 913 P.2d 1075, 
1079 (Cal. 1996); see also WILLIAM P. HOGOBOOM & DONALD B. KING, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE 
GUIDE: FAMILY LAW ¶ 3:3.10, p. 33 (2016) (“In practice, the superior court exercising 
jurisdiction under the Family Code is known as the ‘family court’ or [‘family law court’]. But 
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Family and probate courts have discretion to appoint counsel for 
children.8 But most family courts and many probate courts never 
exercise that discretion.9 A report by the Elkins Family Law Task 
Force expressed concern that other courts routinely appoint 
unqualified lawyers to represent kids as a form of patronage.10 Some 
children need effective lawyers to survive. 
B.  Anquan Paul11 
Anquan Paul is safe at home with his grandparents today 
because his lawyer reversed the effects of a series of ex parte and sua 
sponte orders that had separated him from his grandparents, left him 
homeless for long stretches of time, caused him to fail fifth grade, 
and literally put his life at risk. 
Anquan is an everyday kid from South-Central Los Angeles. He 
loves his blended family, which comprises his maternal 
grandparents, brother, cousins, aunt, and dog—not necessarily in that 
order. He likes sports, goes to school during the week, and goes to 
 
there is no separate ‘family court’ per se.”). The basic outline of family court qua family court 
“jurisdiction” is set out in section 2010 of the California Family Code. 
 7. “Probate jurisdiction is in the superior court, and the probate court is a department of the 
superior court exercising such jurisdiction. Jurisdiction and the power of the probate court are 
statutory.” Richer v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. Rptr. 52, 56 (Ct. App. 1976), overruled on other 
grounds by Kowis v. Howard, 838 P.2d 250, 256 (Cal. 1992). The probate court makes child 
custody orders when it appoints a guardian of the person. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1510 (West 
2016). The probate court also makes child custody orders when it appoints a conservator of the 
person. Conservatorship cases are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 8. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3150(a) (West 2011); CAL. PROB. CODE § 1470 (West 2008); 
Cal. Standards of Judicial Admin. § 5.11(a) (2007); Uniform Marriage & Divorce Act § 310 
(West 1988). 
 9. See infra notes 169, 202 and accompanying text. See generally Amy Pellman, Robert 
Jacobs, & Dara K. Reiner, A Child-Centered Response to the Elkins Family Law Task Force, 20 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 81, 83 n. 13 and 87 (2011) [hereinafter Pellman, Jacobs, & Reiner] 
(noting that the existing family court appointment statute, California Family Code § 3150(a), and 
California Rule of Court 5.240, shed little or no light on two crucial questions: (1) precisely when 
the court shall exercise its discretion to appoint counsel for children, and (2) precisely what is 
appointed counsel’s role in these cases). 
 10. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ELKINS FAMILY LAW 
TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS APRIL 2010 7, 53 (2010), http://www. 
courts.ca.gov/documents/elkins-finalreport.pdf (recognizing a need for “greater transparency and 
clarity regarding how such appointments are made and how complaints regarding performance of 
appointed counsel will be addressed.”). The Supreme Court addressed related concerns in 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) when it required trial courts in 
termination-of-parental- rights hearings to decide on a case-by-case basis whether parties have a 
due process right to counsel, “subject, of course, to appellate review.” Id. at 3132. 
 11. This Article uses pseudonyms for all parents and children and does not cite documents in 
any court file. Supra note 3. 
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church on Sunday. His pastor lives on his block and came to court 
hearings to support him. 
Immediately after he was born, Anquan’s maternal grandparents 
assumed the role of parents, and had sheltered him from his parents’ 
gang culture. Both of Anquan’s parents are convicted felons with 
gang histories and no income. Anquan’s father told a former 
girlfriend that Anquan was conceived in the course of a gang 
initiation rite. Anquan’s mother is in prison for attempting to murder 
a member of a rival gang. His father just got back from prison after 
serving a sentence for residential burglary.12 
After Anquan’s biological mother was arrested for the attempted 
murder that sent her to prison, Anquan’s grandparents filed a probate 
petition in downtown Los Angeles for appointment as Anquan’s 
legal guardians.13 Two days later, Anquan’s biological father filed a 
parentage action in family court, asserting what he believed to be his 
paternal rights.14 He filed his action in Orange County, where he 
lived with a girlfriend and her daughter in the girlfriend’s uncle’s 
home. The girlfriend subsists on the Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) benefits15 she receives for having bipolar disorder. The 
girlfriend’s daughter has autism. 
Judicial decisions in these cases forced Anquan to attend a total 
of five schools in the next three months. A special needs child,16 he 
had received special education services in Los Angeles through an 
Individualized Educational Program (IEP).17 He was entitled to the 
 
 12. “Parental incarceration is independently associated with learning disabilities, attention 
deficit disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, behavioral or conduct problems, 
developmental delays, and speech or language problems” Kristin Turney, Stress Proliferation 
Across Generations? Examining the Relationship Between Parental Incarceration and Childhood 
Health, 55 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 302, 302 (2014). See generally id. (analyzing some of the 
negative consequences of parental incarceration); infra notes 101, 145, 154155 and 
accompanying text (discussing potential adverse effects through the generations of parental 
incarceration). 
 13. See infra notes 22, 25. 
 14. Parentage actions are governed by the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”). CAL. FAM. 
CODE §§ 7600–7730 (West 2016). 
 15. SSI pays cash benefits to low-income individuals who have a “medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment” that makes them unable “to engage in any substantial gainful 
activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (c)(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
 16. See Daniel B. Pickar & Robert L. Kaufman, Drafting Plans for Special Needs Children: 
Applying a Risk-Assessment Model, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 113 (2015) (defining “special needs” and 
explaining their relevance when child custody is at issue); see also infra note 202 and 
accompanying text (citing publications discussing courts’ treatment of “special needs” children). 
 17. An Individualized Educational Program (“IEP”) is the “constitution” that sets up a 
child’s unique needs, establishes his or her present levels of performance, explains and interprets 
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same services at each of his new schools,18 but his IEP never caught 
up to him. As a result of his transfers and failure to receive special 
education, Anquan failed the fifth grade. 
Orange County’s family court got the case off to a bad start 
when it issued an ex parte change-of-custody order19 without waiting 
for Los Angeles County’s probate court to rule, appointing a lawyer 
for Anquan, or hearing any evidence of “immediate danger” or 
“irreparable harm” to anyone.20 The court failed to consider that 
Anquan’s grandfather was his presumed father for custodial 
purposes21 and that both grandparents were presumptively entitled to 
custody as Anquan’s de facto parents.22 
 
the appropriate tests conducted, and suggests how and what goals, objectives, services and 
accommodations are to be developed for the child’s progress. The IEP is a written statement that 
must be developed, reviewed, and revised for each student with a disability. CAL. EDUC. CODE 
§ 56345 (West 2003); 34 C.F.R. § 300.340(a) (2005). 
 18. See, e.g., In re Student with a Disability, 44 IDELR 83 (SEA Mont. 2005) (addressing 
transferability of IEPs). 
 19. Section 3064(a) of the California Family Code states: “The court shall refrain from 
making an order granting or modifying a custody order on an ex parte basis unless there has been 
a showing of immediate harm to the child or immediate risk that the child will be removed from 
the State of California.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 3064(a) (West 2016). Likewise, under California 
Rule of Court 5.151(b)(1), a family court should not order an immediate change of custody absent 
evidence of “an immediate danger or irreparable harm to a party or to the children involved in the 
matter.” CAL. R. CT. 5.151(b)(1) (2016). 
 20. Cf. Robert Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 257 (1975) (reporting that “[i]n many instances, a 
judge lacks adequate information about even the most rudimentary aspects of a child’s life . . . .”). 
 21. A party to a custody proceeding must establish a parent-child relationship before the 
court can adjudicate custody and visitation. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7604, 7635 (West 2016); id. 
§ 7635 (West 2014); HOGOBOOM & KING, supra note 6, at ¶ 7:23, pp. 78 to 79. A party must 
establish that he or she is a “presumed parent” to establish a parent-child relationship. CAL. FAM. 
CODE §§ 7600–7730 (West 2013); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6453 (West 2005). Biology is not destiny 
under the Family Code. It is possible for a man to achieve presumed father status without being 
the biological father; even if paternity is denied and disproved, a man may be deemed to be a 
presumed father. In re Nicholas H., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 152–53 (Ct. App. 2002). In fact, the 
legal trend is to minimize the importance of biology, especially if the child is over two years old. 
See, e.g., In re A.A., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 755 (Ct. App. 2003); In re Kiana A., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669 
(Ct. App. 2001). A “presumed parent” is someone who has demonstrated an abiding commitment 
to the child and the child’s well-being, regardless of his or her relationship with the child’s other 
parent. In re Sabrina H., 266 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276–77 (Ct. App. 1990). The very purpose of 
parentage law is to distinguish those who have demonstrated a commitment to the child 
regardless of biology and grant them the “elevated status of presumed [parenthood].” In re T.R., 
34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 220–21 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 22. A de facto parent is a “person . . . in whose home the child has been living in a 
wholesome and stable environment” for a substantial period of time. CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 3040(a)(2) (West 2004). A showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a proposed 
guardian has acted as a de facto parent creates a rebuttable presumption by clear and convincing 
evidence that it would be detrimental to place the child in the custody of a parent, and the best 
interest of the child requires nonparental custody. Id. § 3041(d) (West 2006); In re Guardianship 
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So Anquan went to live with his biological father. His 
grandparents gave him a cell phone so he could call home. His father 
threw the phone out of the car window on the way to Orange County, 
explaining, “you won’t be needing this.” Several weeks later, 
Anquan’s biological father separated from his girlfriend, leaving her 
responsible for Anquan. Several weeks after that, both Anquan and 
his father disappeared. 
Meanwhile, Los Angeles County’s probate court appointed 
counsel for Anquan. With the help of staff at Anquan’s elementary 
school in Orange County, Anquan’s lawyer traced Anquan to the 
high-desert town of Lancaster in Los Angeles County. From there, 
Anquan and his father moved to South-Central Los Angeles. A 
posting on Anquan’s father’s Facebook page explained all these 
moves: he was “trying to find somewhere to live [sic] me and my 
son.” 
While Anquan and his father were bouncing between the streets 
and other people’s homes, Los Angeles County’s probate court sent 
Anquan’s guardianship case (along with his lawyer) to Orange 
County’s family court, which set a trial in the combined guardianship 
and parentage case. On the day set for trial, however, the court sua 
sponte transferred the combined case to Orange County’s probate 
court to consider appointing Anquan’s grandparents as his guardians. 
But the probate court declined to rule at its initial hearing, leaving 
Anquan in limbo. 
Anquan’s lawyer therefore drafted a motion to join Anquan’s 
grandparents as parties in the family court action.23 At the same time, 
Anquan’s lawyer drafted new pleadings in Orange County’s probate 
court to keep the guardianship case alive. In the end, three months 
after Orange County’s family court removed Anquan from his 
grandparents’ custody, its probate court appointed the grandparents 
 
of Estate of Vaughan, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216 (Ct. App. 2012). This presumption shifts the burden 
of proof to the opposing party to show the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence. CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 3014(c)–(d) (West 2004). This rule recognizes that “continuity and stability in a 
child’s life most certainly count for something” and “in the absence of proof to the contrary, 
removing a child from what has been a stable, continuous, and successful placement is 
detrimental to the child.” In re Guardianship of L.V., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 894, 900–01 (Ct. App. 
2006). 
 23. Under Rule 5.24(c)(2) of the California Rules of Court, “[a] person who has or claims 
custody . . . of any of the minor children subject to the [parentage] action . . . may apply to the 
court for an order joining himself or herself as a party to the proceeding.” CAL. R. CT. 5.24(c)(2) 
(2016). 
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as Anquan’s temporary guardians. Five months later, the probate 
court made that appointment permanent. The family court then 
dismissed the parentage case. 
Without his attorney’s intervention, Anquan would still be with 
his biological father, pounding the streets of the roughest 
neighborhoods in Los Angeles, looking for a stable place to live. 
C.  Esteban Santa Cruz24 
Esteban is a sweet little boy from East Los Angeles who was 
about to start kindergarten. A probate court had appointed his 
maternal grandmother as his guardian25 when he was a baby because 
his parents were, in his maternal grandmother’s words, “living on the 
street, moving from motel to motel . . . on and off drugs.” 
Without appointing a lawyer for Esteban, the court terminated 
the guardianship three years later, after Esteban’s father was released 
from prison. Esteban proceeded to live with his father and his 
father’s husband for about five months. Esteban loves his father but 
wanted to go back home to his grandmother. He explained that his 
father’s husband could be mean. He said that the husband hit him 
when he got mad, and that he would beat up Esteban’s father “right 
in front of me.” Esteban said that happened a lot.26 
The probate court had awarded visitation rights to Esteban’s 
maternal grandmother when it terminated her guardianship.27 The 
court appointed counsel for Esteban when his grandmother came 
back to court to enforce her visitation rights. Both Esteban’s father 
and his husband were present in court. In separate interviews, they 
gave Esteban’s lawyer the same street address but claimed to live in 
different cities. It turned out that the street address does not exist in 
either city, and they had no stable address. 
 
 
 24. This Article uses pseudonyms for all parents and children and does not cite documents in 
any court file. Supra note 3. 
 25. A court may appoint a guardian for a minor “if it appears necessary or convenient.” CAL. 
PROB. CODE § 1514(a) (West 2002). 
 26. Children who are exposed to domestic violence can suffer a form of “secondary abuse” 
because they “are affected by what goes on around them as well as what is directly done to them.” 
In re Heather A., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 321–22 (Ct. App. 1996). Even a child who is not present 
during violent incidents may still be detrimentally affected by the violence because they live with 
the aftermath of and context surrounding violent incidents. Id. at 320. 
 27. Rule 7.1008(a) of the California Rules of Court authorizes the court to “order visitation 
[with the guardian] if it is in the best interest of the child” before terminating a guardianship. 
CAL. R. CT. 7.1008(a) (2016). 
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Esteban’s lawyer tracked down Esteban’s paternal grandmother, 
who told the lawyer that Esteban’s father’s husband used what social 
scientists call, “coercive controlling violence,” to control her son.28 
In addition to beating him up on a regular basis, the husband required 
Esteban’s father to put his telephone on speaker during all phone 
calls, physically held Esteban’s father’s legs while he slept so he 
could not leave when he woke up, and made sure that Esteban’s 
father had no money. 
Research on the effects of a child’s exposure to domestic 
violence shows that it can have an adverse impact across a range of 
child functioning, increases the risk for child abuse, and is associated 
with other risk factors.29 
Esteban’s lawyer immediately arranged to meet the maternal 
grandmother at Public Counsel’s probate clinic,30 which helped her 
file an ex parte petition for reappointment as Esteban’s guardian. The 
probate court granted the petition, and made the appointment 
permanent several months later—but not before Esteban had seen 
things that a little boy should never see and lived through things that 
no one should have to live through. 
III.  MULTIDISCIPLINARY REPRESENTATION: THE MISSING LINK 
A.  Concurrent Jurisdiction and Case Plans 
The family, probate, and juvenile dependency divisions of 
California’s Superior Court31 generally have concurrent jurisdiction 
 
 28. See, e.g., Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate 
Partner Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476 
(2008). 
 29. See supra note 26; infra notes 61–68 and accompanying text. For summaries of the 
empirical research on the effects of domestic violence on children, see Lois A. Weithorn, 
Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child 
Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2001). 
 30. Public Counsel’s Skadden Arps Pro Per Guardianship Clinic assists with legal 
guardianship petitions for adults “caring for children whose parents cannot or will not properly 
care for them.” Pro Per Guardianship Clinic, PUB. COUNS. (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.public 
counsel.org/seminars_clinics?id=0004. 
 31. See supra notes 6 and 7 for a discussion of the jurisdiction of family courts and probate 
courts. The “juvenile dependency court” may take jurisdiction over children who have been 
abused or neglected as described by section 300 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. 
Under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.2, the purpose of dependency law is 
“to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically 
[sexually] or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, 
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are risk of that harm.” CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE § 300.2 (West 2000). 
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over abused and neglected children,32 sometimes over exactly the 
same children.33 County departments of Child Protective Services 
(CPS) play a leading role in choosing the venue for children’s 
cases.34 
But two recent cases create exceptions to this general rule: In In 
re Kaylee H.,35 California’s Fourth District Court of Appeal held that 
a dependency court may not take jurisdiction over a child in order to 
provide her with the services she needs if a probate guardian would 
suffice to protect her from her parents.36 
California’s Second Appellate District took that reasoning a step 
further in In re A.G.,37 holding that a juvenile dependency court erred  
 
 
 32. See Richard Boldt & Jana Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches: Problem-Solving Judges 
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts and Unified Family Courts, 65 MD. L. 
REV. 82, 94 (2006) (discussing the historical development of family courts); cf. Virginia G. 
Weisz & Suzanne McCormick, Abandon Probate Court for Abandoned Children: Combining 
Probate Guardianship of the Person and Dependency into One Stronger, Fairer Children’s 
Court, 12 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 191 (2003) (arguing that “[d]rastic differences in 
the adjudication of guardianship proceedings by juvenile dependency courts and probate courts in 
California deprive children of equal justice under the law and contravene the central goal of 
protecting the ‘best interest of the child.’”). 
 33. Several of the children whose cases are described in this Article had cases in more than 
one of these courts. 
 34. See generally Barbara Flicker, A Short History of Jurisdiction over Juvenile and Family 
Matters, in FROM CHILDREN TO CITIZENS: THE ROLE OF THE JUVENILE COURT (Francis X. 
Hartmann ed., 1987) (providing an overview of the courts and agencies that exercise jurisdiction 
over matters involving children). By directing at-risk children’s cases to family or probate court 
rather than to juvenile dependency court, the child welfare system saves the cost of the “child 
welfare services” discussed infra at note 43 and accompanying text, and economizes on the cost 
of the appointed counsel discussed infra at notes 4445 and 156157 and the accompanying text, 
as well as on the stipends paid to the nonparent caregivers described supra at notes 2223 and 25. 
Most nonparent caregivers appointed in juvenile dependency court receive about twice the 
maximum payment available to nonparent caregivers appointed in family or probate court. When 
they provide “specialized care,” nonparent caregivers appointed in dependency court receive 
several times the maximum payable to nonparent caregivers appointed in family or probate court. 
Compare L.A. CTY. DEP’T OF CHILD. & FAM. SERVS., Rates for Placement and Related Services, 
in CHILD WELFARE POLICY MANUAL § 0900511.10 (2015), http://policy.dcfs.lacounty. 
gov/#AFDC_FC_GRI_FC_Rates.htm%3FTocPath%3DFinancial%20Support%20Systems%7CR
ates%20and%20Allowances%7CRates%20for%20Placement%20and%20Related%20Services%
7C_____0 (showing payment rates for dependency court caregivers), with State Law Changes 
Maximum Aid Payment (MAP) Levels for Cash Aid Recipients, CAL. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS. (Oct. 1, 2016), http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/cdssweb/entres/forms/English/TEMP2250 
.pdf (showing “Maximum Aid Payment (MAP) Levels” for all other caregivers). 
 35. 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 36. Id. at 879–80. The court ruled that “[t]he availability of . . . taxpayer-funded services in 
dependency proceedings is not relevant to the question whether dependency proceedings are 
necessary to protect the child; those services are merely an incidental and necessary benefit to the 
parent when a dependency petition has been filed.” Id. at 878 n.14. 
 37. 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383 (Ct. App. 2013). 
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in sustaining a petition in order to provide services to a mother with a 
mental impairment when the father could take care of the children.38 
“Matters such as this one,” the court held, “belong in family court.”39 
Citing the United Nations’ Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child,40 the court in In re Holly H.41 held that whenever custody is at 
issue, all courts must act in “the best interests of the child.”42 The 
choice of court division, therefore, should not make much difference. 
But “the best interests of the child” turns out to have much different 
meanings in different divisions. 
In juvenile dependency court, most children and parents receive 
“child welfare services” in the form of a “case plan” for periods 
ranging from six months to several years to resolve the issues that 
brought their families to court. “Child welfare services” include: 
[S]ervices . . . directed toward . . . protecting and promoting 
the welfare of all children, including handicapped, 
homeless, dependent, or neglected children [and] preventing 
or remedying, or assisting in the solution of problems which 
may result in, the neglect, abuse, exploitation, or 
delinquency of children . . . .43 
“[U]nless the court finds that the child would not benefit from 
the appointment of counsel,” juvenile dependency courts must 
 
 38. Id. at 392. California’s Second District Court of Appeal held that the juvenile 
dependency court “should have dismissed the petition, staying the order until the father obtained 
from the family court an award of custody to him and monitored visitation to the mother.” 
 39. Id. Cases like In re A.G. blur the traditional distinction between the functions of the 
juvenile dependency court and the family court. See 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383. In In re Chantal S., 
913 P.2d 1075 (Cal. 1996), the court explained that the family court traditionally provides parents 
with a forum to resolve private issues regarding child custody and visitation; both parents are 
presumed to be fit and capable of raising their children. Id. at 1078. In contrast, the juvenile 
court’s traditional role is to protect children by restricting parental behavior with regard to their 
children and the presumption of parental fitness does not apply. In In re A.G., however, a 
presumption of fitness was unjustified as to at least one parent. 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 392. And as 
some of the cases discussed in this Article demonstrate, family and probate courts routinely 
adjudicate cases these days in which children need protection from both parents. 
 40. G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), Declaration of the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1959). 
 41. 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 907 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 42. Id. at 914 n.5. 
 43. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 361.5, 11400, 16501.1 (West 2016). State law defines 
“child welfare services” in section 16501 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. Federal 
law defines the same term at 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1). The Juvenile Court Law requires courts to 
review case plans at six-month intervals, and generally allows parents up to 18 months to comply 
with their case plans and thereby resolve the issues that caused the Court to take jurisdiction over 
their children. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366.21, 366.22, 366.25 (West 2016); cf. In re 
Elizabeth R., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200, 209 (Ct. App. 1995) (allowing additional time for parent with 
mental impairment). 
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appoint independent counsel for every child to protect his or her right 
to a proper case plan.44 Another lawyer represents the State’s parens 
patriae interests in every case.45 To more effectively investigate 
cases and develop better case plans, children’s lawyers in Los 
Angeles County’s dependency courts employ social workers and 
experts,46 and the State’s advocates work with the county’s child 
welfare services agency.47 
By contrast, most family courts and many probate courts refuse 
to appoint counsel for children, thereby leaving at-risk children with 
cases in those courts out in the cold.48 Children generally do not have 
standing to make requests in their own custody cases,49 and in any 
event, standing without representation would be of dubious benefit to 
most kids. Most kids know very little about the world, much less the 
range of possibility in a given case, and they generally would not 
know what to ask for. Children, especially little children, cannot be 
expected to undertake the investigation necessary to develop an 
appropriate case plan. Even if they could stand up for themselves, 
most would not do so because they are intimidated by adults—
 
 44. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West 2016). 
 45. See id. § 318.5. 
 46. In Los Angeles County, the Children’s Law Center of Los Angeles (CLC) represents 
over 80 percent of children in the dependency court, and private attorneys under contract with the 
county represent the rest. See Denise C. Herz et al., Challenges Facing Crossover Youth: An 
Examination of Juvenile-Justice Decision Making and Recidivism, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 305, 312 
(2010). 
 47. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 272 (West 2016). 
 48. See supra note 5 and infra notes 49, 157, and 169170 (describing restrictions on 
children’s participation in family and probate court proceedings). 
 49. Minors are not parties to marital actions; therefore, they are not entitled to guardians ad 
litem. In re Marriage of Lloyd, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37, 41 (Ct. App. 1997). With exceptions not 
relevant here, “[t]he only persons permitted to be parties to a proceeding for dissolution, legal 
separation, or nullity of marriage are the spouses.” CAL. R. CT. 5.16 (2016). California law is not 
very clear about children’s standing in probate court. The legislative history of California Probate 
Code section 1470, which gives the court discretion to appoint counsel to represent children, 
analogizes guardianship cases to marital actions: the court’s authority to appoint counsel “is 
comparable to the court’s authority . . . to appoint private counsel to represent the minor’s 
interests in connection with a child custody issue arising in a proceeding under the Family Law 
Act.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 1470 (West 2011); see Guardianship-Conservatorship Law, 14 CAL. L. 
REV. COMM’N REPS. 501, 538 (1978). California Family Code section 7635 makes some children 
parties to parentage proceedings and requires family courts to appoint guardians ad litem under 
defined circumstances, but the authors have never seen that happen. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7635 
(West 2016). See generally Ellen B. Wells, Unanswered Questions: Standing and Party Status of 
Children in Custody and Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 95, 102–04 (1995) 
(addressing the “paradox inherent in a system [that] continues to place limitations on the 
participation of children in custody and visitation proceedings” when children have “gained the 
right to participate fully” in various kinds of non-custody proceedings). Cf. supra note 5. 
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especially adults in positions of authority, like parents.50 
Neither family courts nor probate courts have access to the 
social workers, experts, or investigators necessary to handle a 
difficult case,51 and both courts are infamous for misusing the 
resources they do have.52 
 
 50. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (explaining that “[c]hildren, by 
definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves . . . the State must play 
its part as parens patriae.”); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (holding that 
constitutional rights of children could not be equated with those of adults because of their 
“peculiar vulnerability . . . [and] inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature 
manner . . .”). 
 51. Rules 5.220 and 5.215(b)(4) of the California Rules of Court authorize family courts in 
some counties to obtain an interview with a child, a “partial evaluation” from court staff, or a 
“full evaluation” including psychological tests from a credentialed expert. CAL. R. CT. 5.220 
(2016); CAL. R. CT. 5.215 (2006); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 2032.020 (West 2014); CAL. 
FAM. CODE §§ 3110–3118 (West 2005); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 730, 733 (West 1995). Section 
1513 of the California Probate Code authorizes probate courts to order investigations in 
guardianship cases. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1513 (West 2016). Interviews, partial evaluations, 
experts’ opinions, and investigators’ reports are not designed to replace lawyers or to resolve any 
of the issues discussed in this Article. See, e.g., Leslie O. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863 
(Ct. App. 2014) (removing expert who assumed role of advocate). Neither the interviewers, the 
evaluators, nor the courts themselves make any attempt to measure outcomes, but there is little 
reason to believe that these resources produce benefits for at-risk children in difficult cases. 
Evaluators have no duties to or relationship with the child; rarely address the child's health, 
education, or welfare in any meaningful way; have no legal expertise, and cannot research the 
relevant issues in a case or file pleadings or appear for the child in court; and cannot monitor 
compliance with court orders because they generally are relieved after every hearing. Partial 
evaluators and interviewers have no means to resolve difficult factual disputes about important 
issues like domestic violence, substance abuse, parental incapacity, or a child’s special needs, and 
have no means to discover placement options when awarding custody to either parent would be 
detrimental to the child. 
 52. Family courts misuse their resources when, for example, they use the mechanisms 
described in the preceding note to appoint self-styled experts to recommend custody-and-
visitation schedules based on "clinical impressions" that have no real scientific basis. The 
Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (“AFCC”) has published Guidelines for Brief 
Focused Assessment: AFCC Taskforce on Brief Focused Assessments, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 558 
(2012), urging courts not to draw large inferences from partial evaluations. Likewise, the 
American Psychological Association’s ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF 
CONDUCT § 9.02 (2010) cautions experts to rely only on “assessment instruments whose validity 
and reliability have been established for use with members of the population tested.” But family 
and probate courts ignore these precautions every court day. See, e.g., Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. 
Ramsey, Child Custody Evaluations: The Need for Systems-Level Outcome Assessments, 47 FAM. 
CT. REV. 286, 287 (2009) (finding no evidence that evaluations produce better outcomes for 
children, yet “[m]any reasonable, but anecdotal, reports” indicate that judges rely on them 
anyway because they “find custody cases to be difficult and frustrating . . .” (citations omitted)). 
Timothy M. Tippins and Jeffrey P. Wittmann, in Empirical and Ethical Problems with Custody 
Recommendations: A Call for Clinical Humility and Judicial Vigilance, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 193 
(2005) explain that the partial evaluations and full evaluations described supra in note 51 enable 
family and probate courts to ignore the rules of evidence that protect litigants in other courts, and 
encourage them to rely on insufficient data, including otherwise inadmissible hearsay and tests 
whose validity and reliability cannot be established. California's Supreme Court put a stop to 
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“Multidisciplinary representation” can be the missing link 
between children and justice in family and probate courts. The cases 
discussed in this part show that just like kids in juvenile dependency 
court, some kids in family and probate court need help to investigate 
their cases and to develop and enforce effective case plans. 
“Multidisciplinary representation” means bringing together people 
from different professions and sectors of the community to address 
complex multigenerational parenting pathologies that cannot be 
resolved by tweaking a custody schedule.53 
California’s Judicial Council adopted this model in 2012 when it 
enacted California Rule of Court 5.242,54 which generally authorizes 
children’s lawyers to use all available resources and do as much as 
possible to advance the interests of the kids they represent.55 
B.  Veronica Beltran56 
In family court, a case plan is known as a “parenting plan.”57 
Substantive justice in family court means a parenting plan that serves 
 
some of this legal legerdemain in a recent criminal case, People v. Sanchez, 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
102, 111 (2016), holding that an expert may not “supply case-specific facts about which he or she 
has no personal knowledge.” A venerable line of California cases, beginning with People v. Kelly, 
130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976), keeps out of other courts opinions based on scientifically unproven 
assessment instruments. There is no good reason to apply different rules in family or probate 
courts. See, e.g., Elkins v. Superior Court, 163 P.3d 160, 17778 (Cal. 2007) (holding that due 
process requires that family court litigation proceed under the same rules of evidence and 
procedure as other matters). 
 53. Multidisciplinary representation seems to be an idea whose time has come in juvenile 
dependency court. See Vivek S. Sankaran et al., Strange Bedfellows: How Child Welfare 
Agencies Can Benefit from Investing in Multidisciplinary Parent Representation at 2, CTR. 
STUDY SOC. POL’Y, http://www.cssp.org/reform/child-welfare/strange-bedfellows-how-child-
welfare-agencies-benefit-from-multidisciplinary-parent-represenation.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 
2016) (noting that “[l]egal offices across the country” are providing clients “with the assistance of 
a team consisting of a lawyer, social worker and a parent mentor . . .”). 
 54. CAL. R. CT. 5.242 (j)(1), (j)(5), (k)(3), (k)(4) (2014). 
 55. When it enacted this rule, the Judicial Council rejected the Elkins Family Law Task 
Force’s contrary recommendations, which prescribed a much narrower role for a minor’s counsel. 
See Pellman, Jacobs, & Reiner, supra note 9, at 112–129. 
 56. This Article uses pseudonyms for all parents and children, and it does not cite documents 
in any court file. Supra note 3. 
 57. For a brief discussion of “case plans,” see supra note 43 and accompanying text. In 
Montenegro v. Diaz, 27 P.3d 289 (Cal. 2001), the court held that section 3040(b) of the California 
Family Code allows family courts “the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the 
best interest of the child.” Id. at 292–93; see infra note 58. See generally Steve Baron, Issue 
Facing Family Courts: The Scope of Family Court Intervention 4 J. CTR. FAM. CHILD & CTS. 
115, 115 (2003) (“[A]dvocating an expanded scope of the family court to deal with family 
dysfunction . . . .”). 
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the child’s best interest.58 Parenting plans can be complicated and 
involve a lot of work. Justice in family court for Veronica Beltran 
required a parenting plan to reduce the intense hostility between her 
parents59 and teach her parents much better parenting skills,60 or at 
least to shelter her as much as possible from their continuing conflict. 
Very few parents would slap a small child in the face, but the 
way some parents treat each other can amount to the same thing. 
Intense parental conflict is bad for children, especially young 
children:61 “In acute form, [conflict] elicit[s] in children the same 
shortness of breath, increased blood pressure and heart rate, fear etc., 
that we all experience when threatened, because they are caused by 
the instantaneous release of the same powerful hormones.”62 Chronic 
conflict can produce physical changes in a child’s brain that can 
 
 58. See generally Andrew Schepard & Peter Salem, Foreword to the Special Issue on the 
Family Law Education Reform Project, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 513, 516 (2006) (explaining that 
“today’s family court judge . . . [should] oversee a multidisciplinary group of service providers all 
engaged with the children and families whose cases are before the court.”). Chapter 1 
(commencing with section 3020) and chapter 2 (commencing with section 3040) of part 2 of 
division 8 of the California Family Code, identify the factors that trial courts must consider and 
procedures they must follow in resolving child-custody disputes. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 et seq. 
(West 2016); see id. § 3011 (West 2013); id. § 2335 (West 2004) (disallowing findings of fault in 
divorce cases); id. § 3100. See generally In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 478 (Cal. 
1996) (noting that the Family Code affords a trial court “the widest discretion to choose a 
parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child,” and lists relevant evidentiary factors). 
 59. Some parent-education programs aimed at reducing conflict between parents and 
improving ties with children have been shown to shield children from conflict, promote strong 
relationships with parents, and increase child satisfaction. Tamara A. Fackrell et al., A Special 
Focus on Court-Affiliated Parent Education Programs: How Effective Are Court-Affiliated 
Divorcing Parents Education Programs? A Meta-Analytic Study, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 107 (2011); 
see infra notes 70–73. 
 60. In California, family courts have jurisdiction to order parents and children to participate 
in outpatient counseling with a licensed mental health professional or through other community 
counseling services (including mental health or substance abuse services) for not more than one 
year to address family functioning. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3190(a) (West 2016). The counseling 
must be specifically designed to facilitate communication between the parties regarding their 
child’s best interests, to reduce conflicts over visitation and custody, or to “improve the quality of 
parenting skills of each parent.” Id. § 3191. But see infra note 93. 
 61. CARLA B. GARRITY & MITCHELL A. BARIS, CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: PROTECTING THE 
CHILDREN OF HIGH-CONFLICT DIVORCE 26 (1994) (“Those who witness intense bitterness 
between their parents and are caught repeatedly in loyalty binds are at high risk for later 
emotional disturbance. Parental conflict interrupts many of the critical tasks of psychological 
development”); see supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 62. William V. Fabricius et al., Parenting Time, Parent Conflict, Parent-Child 
Relationships, and Children’s Physical Health, in PARENTING PLAN EVALUATIONS: APPLIED 
RESEARCH FOR THE FAMILY COURT 188, 205 (Kathryn F. Kuehnle & Leslie M. Drozd eds., 
2012). 
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“adversely color” the rest of his or her life.63 
Veronica’s parents separated in 2008, when she was four years 
old. Between March 17, 2011 and August 7, 2014, the family court 
issued twenty-four orders related to custody in their divorce case. 
During the same period, CPS completed countless informal 
investigations and five formal investigations of reported child abuse 
without filing a dependency petition, several local police 
departments investigated numerous reports of domestic violence, Los 
Angeles County’s District Attorney convicted Veronica’s father of 
domestic violence for punching her mother in the buttocks, and Los 
Angeles County’s Superior Court dismissed an action by Veronica’s 
paternal grandmother against Veronica’s mother for alleged elder 
abuse. In dismissing that case, the court rejected the testimony of 
Veronica’s three paternal aunts in support of the paternal 
grandmother. 
The acute conflict between her parents was more than Veronica 
could handle.64 She was having clinically significant panic attacks 
several times a week, as well as nightmares, difficulty sleeping, and 
irritability.65 Although Veronica was a bright girl, her grades were 
poor and getting worse from year to year and marking period to 
marking period.66 She finished fourth grade in June 2014 with two 
 
 63. Understanding the Effects of Maltreatment on Brain Development, ISSUE BRIEF 67 
(Child Welfare Info. Gateway, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2015, https://www.childwelfare.gov/ 
pubPDFs/brain_development.pdf (summarizing neuroimaging studies of children exposed to 
“toxic stress” showing “reduced volume in the hippocampus, which is central to learning and 
memory;” “decreased volume in the cerebellum, which helps coordinate motor behavior and 
executive functioning;” a “smaller prefrontal cortex, which is critical to behavior, cognition, and 
emotional regulation;” and abnormal cortisol levels, which affect energy resources, cognitive 
processes, immune and inflammatory reactions, and affective disorders); see supra note 29. 
 64. Intense conflict between parents can be a form of emotional child abuse. In In re Heather 
A., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (Ct. App. 1996), the court recognized that children “are affected by what 
goes on around them as well as what is directly done to them.” Id. at 321–22. According to a 
recent study, children who are emotionally abused and neglected face similar and sometimes 
worse mental health problems than children who are physically or sexually abused. Joseph 
Spinazzola, Unseen Wounds: The Contribution of Psychological Maltreatment to Child and 
Adolescent Mental Health and Risk Outcomes, 6 PSYCHOL. TRAUMA: THEORY, RES., PRAC., & 
POL’Y S18, S20, S24 (2014). 
 65. Unless they incur physiological damage, most children are resilient and return to 
baseline functioning within one to two years, but an important minority of children suffer long-
term negative mental and physical health consequences well into adulthood. One of the most 
well-established factors in predicting negative outcomes for children is high levels of marital 
conflict during and after a divorce. Ryan D. Davidson et al., Psychological and Biological 
Processes in Children Associated with High Conflict Parental Divorce, 65 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 29 
(2014). 
 66. See infra note 111 (discussing the relationship between family strife and bad grades). 
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Bs, two Ds, and nine Fs. Unless her family situation changed 
dramatically, Veronica’s prognosis67 was not good. Longitudinal 
studies show that the prognosis is poor for children with behavioral 
problems from dysfunctional families.68 
By the time the court appointed counsel for her in March 2014, 
Veronica was cathected to her father and bitterly estranged from her 
mother for reasons that seemed completely disproportionate to any 
alleged offense.69 Compounding the problem—or perhaps describing 
the same problem in a different way—Veronica’s father seemed 
existentially threatened by any attempt to improve Veronica’s 
relationship with her mother. 
In May 2014, Veronica’s lawyer and her parents negotiated a 
stipulated parenting plan.70 The plan required the parents to hire a 
licensed clinical social worker (LCSW) as a parenting coach and 
liaison with minor’s counsel. With her background as clinical 
director of a community-based mental health agency serving low-
income children and families, founder of the mental health 
department of a large foster family agency, adoptive mother and 
foster mother, the LCSW was exceptionally qualified to help this 
 
 67. “Prognosis” is the essence of the judicial function in child custody cases. ANDREW 
SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING 
FAMILIES 3 (2004) (positing that “[i]n a child custody case . . . a court reconstructs past events 
concerning family relationships for the purpose of making a prediction about the future . . . . That 
prediction is not made to assess blame . . . but to make an educated guess about what will happen 
to the child if the court orders one custody arrangement or the other.”). 
 68. Research consistently associates family relationships marked by high levels of conflict 
with mental health problems in childhood and adulthood. See, e.g., E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & 
JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED (2003); Rena L. Repetti et 
al., Risky Families: Family Social Environments and the Mental and Physical Health of 
Offspring, 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 330 (2002). Behavioral problems often become chronic, persist 
into adulthood, and are transmitted from one generation to the next. See generally Inge Van 
Meurs et al., Intergenerational Transmission of Child Problem Behaviors: A Longitudinal, 
Population-Based Study, 48 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 138 (2009) 
(documenting that unemployment, poverty, mental illness, and incarceration can cycle through 
the generations); Judith S. Brook et al., Intergenerational Transmission of Risks for Problem 
Behavior, 30 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 65 (2002) (same). 
 69. See infra note 82 (regarding children who are estranged from a parent). 
 70. There are three kinds of parenting plans: Plan A is for parents who have decided to go 
their separate ways for reasons that are not the court’s concern and need little more than a custody 
schedule and a division of property. Plan B is for parents who must change and can, with help. 
Plan C is for families that may need an intermediary until the last child leaves the home. See 
generally Jay Lebow & Kathleen N. Rekart, Integrative Family Therapy for High-Conflict 
Divorce with Disputes over Child Custody and Visitation, 46 FAM. PROCESS 79 (2007) 
(describing family therapy targeted toward families “locked in intractable disputes”). All 
indications are that Veronica will need Plan C. 
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family.71 The plan also required the parents to (1) stop discussing 
their problems and saying negative things about each other around 
Veronica, (2) attend individual therapy to figure out what makes 
their divorce so difficult,72 (3) enroll in co-parenting classes to figure 
out how to start cooperating,73 (4) enroll Veronica in a better school, 
and (5) find Veronica a math tutor. The stipulated plan also 
authorized the noncustodial parent to call Veronica once a day and 
no more; and ordered the parents to communicate only via an email 
service known as Our Family Wizard (OFW)74 except in 
emergencies. The plan assigned primary physical custody to 
Veronica’s mother because her father’s job required him to work out 
of town on a frequent and unpredictable basis. 
Both parents ignored most of their stipulated order, but 
Veronica’s mother did enroll her in a much better school (over 
Father’s objection) and hired the LCSW at a sharply discounted rate. 
Veronica’s father’s behavior during two conjoint sessions with the 
 
 71. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Cohen, Managed Care and the Evolving Role of the Clinical Social 
Worker in Mental Health, 48 SOC. WORK 1, 34–43 (2003) (finding that managed care institutions 
see licensed clinical social workers as viable alternatives to clinical psychologists and 
psychiatrists because of their extensive training and ability to provide assessments and provide 
non-medical mental health treatment); see also infra note 72 (regarding the importance of 
interventions based on evidence). 
 72. All therapists are not created equal, and therapy is not a talisman that works simply by 
invoking it. See, e.g., Lucy Berliner et al., Report of the APSAC Task Force on Evidence-Based 
Service Planning Guidelines for Child Welfare, 20 CHILD MALTREATMENT 6, 8 (2015); William 
R. Miller et al., Evidence-Based Treatment: Why, What, When, Where and How?, 29 J. 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 267, 267–68 (2005) (finding that clinicians too often use 
unsupported interventions and deprive their clients of effective treatments). Los Angeles 
County’s Superior Court maintains a list of counselors and evaluators, but makes no 
representations regarding the clinicians’ relative qualifications, techniques or effectiveness. 
Choosing a Counselor or Evaluator, SUPER. CT. OF CAL., CTY. OF L.A., http://www.lacourt.org/ 
flresource/ui/fl0108.aspx (last visited Aug. 21, 2016). The California Clearinghouse of Evidence 
Based Programs for Child Welfare attempts to fill in some of these gaps. Welcome to the CEBC: 
California Evidence-Based Clearinghouse for Child Welfare, CAL. EVIDENCE-BASED 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.cebc4cw.org/home (last visited Aug. 21, 2016); see infra note 73. 
 73. Co-parenting classes are not universally effective, and some are more effective than 
others. See, e.g., Margie J. Geasler & Karen R. Blaisure, 1998 Nationwide Survey of Court-
Connected Divorce Education Programs, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 36, 37 (1999) 
(suggesting that courts should adopt written standards to guide the implementation of divorce 
education programs such as co-parenting classes because they need to be “based on a sound 
framework that documents current and best practices in content development, instructional or 
teaching strategies, implementation issues, and evaluation efforts”); see also Fackrell et al., supra 
note 59, at 113–15 (noting that some parent-education programs have proven to be effective at 
reducing conflict between parents, improving ties with children, and shield children from parental 
conflict); infra note 97 and accompanying text (regarding the negative effects of poverty); infra 
note 104 (regarding the Positive Parenting Program). 
 74. See OUR FAMILY WIZARD, http://ourfamilywizard.com (last visited Aug. 21, 2016). 
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LCSW in July offered insight into family dynamics: he openly 
expressed his concerns about her mother’s parenting style as well as 
his concerns regarding other case-related issues in front of Veronica. 
He could not contain such conversation even with prompts from the 
LCSW and feedback from Veronica that such talk made her anxious. 
Veronica was fidgety during these sessions, and she had pressured 
speech, difficulty with word retrieval, and difficulty focusing on the 
conversation. 
During an individual session on a Tuesday with the LCSW, 
Veronica’s father called her twice on her cell phone. When Veronica 
saw the call, she visibly tensed, moved to a corner of the couch, and 
curled in a ball with a pillow in her lap. Her mood immediately 
changed from happy and wistful to tense and serious. When she 
answered, she softly told her father that she was in session and would 
call back when it was over. When the session ran a bit longer than 
scheduled, her father called repeatedly, starting precisely at the time 
the session was scheduled to end, until Veronica answered the phone. 
Veronica’s individual session with the LCSW was scheduled for 
every Tuesday at the same time, and the LCSW had spoken with her 
father the preceding Sunday night to confirm that the session would 
happen as scheduled that week. Both the stipulated family court 
order in May and the criminal court order in the domestic violence 
case limited Veronica’s father to one call per day, except in an 
emergency. 
So why was her father calling Veronica during therapy? 
Ostensibly to make sure that she was supervised and OK. But 
Tuesday nights during therapy, ironically, were the only times that 
Veronica’s father should have known that she was supervised and 
OK. Veronica’s mother had custody on most other weekday 
evenings, and routinely left Veronica alone for hours at a time. 
As a “mandated reporter”75 under California’s Child Abuse and 
Reporting Act (CANRA),76 the LCSW had reported this practice to 
CPS, which rejected the report, apparently on the ground that leaving 
a ten-year-old alone at night for several hours on a regular basis does 
not meet its criteria for abuse or neglect.77 
 
 75. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.7(a) (West 2016). 
 76. See id. §§ 11164–11174.3. 
 77. See Child Protection Hotline, DCFS (July 29, 2015), http://policy.dcfs.lacounty.gov/ 
content/Child_Protection_Hotline.htm (authorizing CPS to screen calls reporting alleged abuse or 
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After hearing about these developments, the family court 
ordered Veronica’s lawyer to find a nonparent to take custody. But a 
nonparent was not an option; CPS had rejected the case time and 
again.78 Veronica’s paternal relatives had proved in the elder abuse 
case that they would go to extraordinary lengths to undermine her 
relationship with her mother, in violation of California’s public 
policy to preserve the relationship between the child and both 
parents.79 Veronica’s maternal relatives were not an option because 
her grandmother lives in a three-bedroom home with her only uncle, 
who has schizophrenia, and her only aunt, who is divorced and has 
two young children who have been “out of control” since the 
divorce. 
The court’s order just hardened Father’s refusal to cooperate. 
With no third party available to take custody, it became minor’s 
counsel’s challenge to work with Veronica, her mother, and the 
LCSW to put together a successful parenting plan without any 
cooperation from Veronica’s father. 
But the court’s new orders got Veronica’s mother’s attention. 
She immediately enrolled in a co-parenting class to learn the 
“parallel parenting” skills necessary to raise a child with an 
uncooperative  ex-spouse.80   Cooperative   parenting  is  the  optimal 
 
 
neglect). 
 78. Veronica may thereby have dodged a bullet. A recent study questions whether CPS has 
produced any net improvement anywhere in the lives of children. Kristine A. Campbell et al., 
Household, Family, and Child Risk Factors After an Investigation for Suspected Child 
Maltreatment: A Missed Opportunity for Prevention, 164 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT 
MED. 943, 947 (2010); see infra Part III. 
 79. It is California’s public policy to preserve the relationship between the child and both 
parents. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(c) (West 2013); id. §§ 3020(b), 3040, 3047 (West 2004). In 
allocating custody, California’s “friendly parent” statute requires family courts to consider 
“which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the 
noncustodial parent.” Id. § 3040(a) (West 2004). Social science research strongly supports this 
policy and law. See Fabricius et al., supra note 62, at 195 (2011) (concluding that “[t]he strength 
of the association between PT [i.e. parenting time] with [the noncustodial parent] and ES [i.e. 
emotional security of the child] is substantial.” Both the chapter and the book as a whole strongly 
endorse 50/50 custody arrangements in ordinary cases.). 
 80. Social scientists use the term, “parallel parenting,” to describe a style of parenting in 
which parents take turns raising the child separately, both doing the best job they can do during 
the time the child is in their care. It is to be distinguished from, “cooperative parenting,” the style 
used “by families in which conflict is low and parents can effectively communicate about their 
child.” PHILIP M. STAHL, PARENTING AFTER DIVORCE: A GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS 
AND MEETING YOUR CHILDREN’S NEEDS 31 (2000); see id. at 3139; Joan B. Kelly, Developing 
Beneficial Parenting Plan Models for Children Following Separation and Divorce, 19 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS. 237, 252 (2005). 
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mode after a divorce, but children can thrive without it so long as 
they are sheltered as much as possible from continuing conflict.81 
Veronica’s mother also immediately found Veronica a math tutor 
who agreed to babysit when she was out of the house. 
These things have made a difference. Several weeks after the 
court date, Father had Veronica call her mother several times during 
her co-parenting class to rearrange a visit. The teacher overheard 
these calls and used them as teachable moments. The teacher 
coached Veronica’s mother to clarify what Veronica was asking and 
promise to call her back. Veronica started escalating, demanding that 
her mother tell her yes or no right then. It turned out that this was the 
second time that day that Father had asked for changes through 
Veronica. 
With the teacher’s prompting, Veronica’s mother managed to 
tell Veronica that she would be emailing Father through OFW to 
resolve the issue. Veronica continued to push for compliance with 
the change. The teacher told Veronica’s mother to hold fast, tell her, 
“I love you,” and hang up, which is what she did. Her mother was on 
her way. She is learning that listening is an important skill for 
parents, but it is a parent’s job to make parental decisions, and she 
can do that job with or without Father’s cooperation. 
Veronica’s strong preference for her father and determination to 
put this preference into effect were separate but related issues. 
Veronica seemed to have CPS on speed dial, and she promised to 
keep calling CPS until it removed her from her mother’s custody and 
replaced her with her father. 
Veronica was not above manipulating a situation to put her 
mother in a bad light. One morning, for example, she refused to go to 
school, urging her mother to leave her home alone. The LCSW tried 
 
 81. Researchers conventionally divide divorced and separated parents into three categories 
based on the nature of their relationship: 
Approximately [twenty-five to thirty percent] of parents have a cooperative co-parental 
relationship, characterized by joint planning, flexibility of schedule, provision of some 
parenting support to each other, and coordination of children’s activities and schedules. 
The majority, more than half, settle into parallel parenting in which emotional 
disengagement, low conflict, and minimal communication about their children 
predominate. While this is less optimal for children than cooperative co-parenting, 
children do thrive in these arrangements, particularly when the quality of parenting in 
each home is nurturing and adequate. The remaining parents, about [twenty percent], 
have a continuing conflicted relationship, with poor communication and little if any 
cooperation. 
Kelly, supra note 80, at 252 (citations omitted). 
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to intervene without success. Minutes after her mother left for work, 
Veronica called her father to report that she was home by herself. 
Father called CPS, which arrived minutes before Veronica’s 
babysitter. 
Veronica also seemed to be learning how to trigger her own 
panic attacks. When upset with her mother or seeking to gain the 
attention of her father, Veronica would begin to cry, breathe in a very 
shallow manner, and engage in negative and irrational self-talk. She 
would continue this process until her body took over and exhibited 
all the classic signs of a panic attack. This is in contrast with and in 
addition to the seemingly uncontrollable panic attacks that she would 
suffer multiple times weekly related to high-conflict interactions 
between her parents. 
Veronica has a strained relationship with her mother for several 
reasons.82 But Father was not wrong to trace part of the problem to 
parenting styles. In sessions with Veronica, the LCSW learned that 
Veronica’s mother had developed a very authoritarian parenting style 
in a determined but fruitless attempt to raise Veronica’s grades and 
gain compliance at home. Her mother made rules that she did not 
explain, relied on punishments rather than rewards, and spent a lot of 
time and energy nagging and scolding Veronica.83 
Father’s parenting style was precisely the opposite. He told the 
LCSW that he refused to waste his limited quality time on 
Veronica’s homework. Explaining her preference for her father, 
Veronica used an example: If Veronica wanted chicken, and her 
mother was on the phone, she would tell Veronica to wait until she 
got off the phone. Her father, by contrast, would hang up and get her 
 
 82. An enormous amount of research in recent decades has gone into children who are 
estranged from a parent. See, e.g., Barbara Jo Fidler & Nicholas Bala, Children Resisting 
Postseparation Contact with a Parent: Concepts, Controversies, and Conundrums, 48 FAM. CT. 
REV. 10, 11 (2010). There are many pathways that can lead to a postseparation estrangement 
from a parent, “including normal developmental preferences for one parent, alignments that are 
reactions to the specific circumstances of the divorce, and estrangement from a parent who has 
been neglectful or abusive,” and alienating behavior by the other parent. Janet R. Johnston, 
Children of Divorce Who Reject a Parent and Refuse Visitation: Recent Research & Social Policy 
Implications for the Alienated Child, 38 FAM. L.Q. 757, 762 (2004) (emphasis added); see also 
Parenting Plan Evaluations: Applied Research for the Family Court (Kathryn F. Kuehnle & Leslie 
M. Drozd eds., 2012) (summarizing the social science research); John HARTSON & BRENDA 
PAYNE, CREATING EFFECTIVE PARENTING PLANS: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH FOR 
LAWYERS AND DIVORCE PROFESSIONALS 203–04 (2006) (developing a checklist of relevant 
considerations to help practitioners distinguish among these situations). 
 83. See infra note 119 (regarding authoritarian parenting). 
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chicken. If there was no chicken in the house, then her father would 
go to the store and get some.84 
To help Veronica’s mother develop more productive strategies 
and to prevent more panic attacks, the LCSW and Veronica’s 
mother’s therapist worked collaboratively and scheduled several 
sessions with Veronica’s mother to teach the principles suggested in 
Susan Stiffelman’s Parenting Without Power Struggles: Raising 
Joyful, Resilient Kids While Staying Cool, Calm, and Connected85 
and Sharon Ellison’s and Ami Atkinson’s audio book, Taking Power 
Struggle out of Parenting.86 A virtue of the latter is that parents get to 
hear what they sound like when they are nagging and scolding their 
children. Both the LCSW and the coparenting teacher therapists 
remain available to Veronica’s mother in times of “crisis” so that 
they can coach her and support her through the use of techniques 
taught in these resources. 
The goals in working with Veronica have been twofold: improve 
her relationship with her mother and decrease anxious and defiant 
behavior. Much of the work with her mother has been to help her 
understand the dynamics of trauma and loss in divorce, learn skills to 
help Veronica cope with her emotions, learn appropriate parent/child 
boundaries, and develop a more authoritative parenting style.87 
The LCSW has also worked with Veronica and her mother to 
improve communication, develop skills to more effectively address 
problems that arose in their relationship, and engage in attachment 
building exercises to improve their bond. Individually, the LCSW 
has worked with Veronica to develop anxiety reduction skills, grieve 
the loss of her parents’ marriage, improve communication with her 
mother, and work through the trauma she experienced through the 
course of her parents’ high conflict divorce. 
Veronica’s mother is changing as of the date of this article. She 
is putting up stronger boundaries between herself and Father. She is 
 
 
 84. See infra note 120 (regarding permissive parenting). 
 85. SUSAN STIFFELMAN, PARENTING WITHOUT POWER STRUGGLES: RAISING JOYFUL, 
RESILIENT KIDS WHILE STAYING COOL, CALM, AND CONNECTED (2012). 
 86. SHARON ELLISON & AMI ATKINSON, TAKING POWER STRUGGLE OUT OF PARENTING 
(2007). 
 87. For extensive discussions of the benefits to children of an authoritative parenting style, 
see ROBERT E. LARZELERE ET AL., AUTHORITATIVE PARENTING: SYNTHESIZING NURTURANCE 
AND DISCIPLINE FOR OPTIMAL CHILD DEVELOPMENT (2013). 
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becoming authoritative, not authoritarian, with Veronica.88 And she 
is learning to disengage when Veronica’s emotions threaten to spiral 
out of control. Father has done nothing to change, and so is still the 
same. 
Veronica’s strong preference for her father has not changed, and 
she still does not express much warmth toward her mother. But she is 
generally compliant at home with her mother, does not call CPS as a 
means of control, is no longer having panic attacks, and continues to 
engage in communication and attachment-related work with her 
mother. Her grade point average on her most recent report card was 
3.2. 
C.  Vickie Cienfuegos89 
In probate court, as in family court, justice can require more 
than a custody-and-visitation schedule.90 Justice in probate court for 
Vickie Cienfuegos required a plan that would give her a chance to 
break out of a family culture that had produced at least three straight 
generations of welfare grifters and substance abusers.91 Probate 
courts can order plans like that.92 But they almost never do.93 
 
 88. See id.; infra note 119 (regarding authoritative and authoritarian parenting). 
 89. This Article uses pseudonyms for all parents and children and does not cite documents in 
any court file. Supra note 3. 
 90. See supra notes 5758 (explaining substantive justice in family court). Section 1514, 
subdivision (b) of the California Probate Code imports the same standards into probate court 
guardianship-of-the-person proceedings. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1514(b) (West 2002). 
 91. For a review of some of the literature on substance abuse and parenting, see Linda C. 
Mayes, Substance Abuse and Parenting, in 4 HANDBOOK OF PARENTING 329 (Marc H. Bornstein 
ed., 2002). 
 92. A guardian is “subject to the regulation and control of the [probate] court in the 
performance of the duties of the office.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 2102 (West 2002). Citing a prior 
version of section 2102 in Guardianship of Reynolds, the court held that the probate court’s 
jurisdiction is a continuing one, and “as an arm of the court the guardian . . . acts under the 
authority of the supervision of the court which appointed him.” In re Reynolds’ Guardianship, 
141 P.2d 498, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943). California’s Attorney General has concluded from this 
that “the probate court in the exercise of its continuing jurisdiction . . . [may] issue instructions 
providing for the mental and physical welfare of [a ward].” 65 OPS. CAL. ATT’Y GEN. 417, 420 
(1982). 
 93. See Weisz & McCormick, supra note 32. California Family Code section 3026 causes 
confusion in this area when it says, “[f]amily reunification services shall not be ordered as a part 
of a child custody or visitation rights proceeding.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 3026 (West 2016). Section 
3026 fails to define the services that are prohibited, and no trial court has been reversed under this 
section. See id. Section 3026 can be harmonized with the statutes cited supra at note 60 
authorizing the court to make counseling and related orders by construing section 3026 to address 
the purpose of services, rather than the services themselves. This construction would allow trial 
courts to make orders addressed to parents’ deficiencies and children’s needs so long as the orders 
are not for the purpose of “family reunification.” 
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Vickie lived with her maternal great grandmother, grandmother, 
and aunt in a matriarchy of women with long histories of substance 
abuse. All the adults stayed home and collected welfare. Nobody 
showed any interest in getting a job to support herself or Vickie.94 
The grandmother was Vickie’s legal guardian. She swore that she 
had no interest in Vickie’s welfare check. It later turned out that the 
grandmother needed Vickie’s check to support herself because she 
had exhausted her own welfare eligibility.95 
At the same time, everybody in Vickie’s family is smart. 
Vickie’s mother wrote a long autobiography when she was all of 
nineteen years old. As dark and personal as it is, the autobiography 
can be read as the autobiography of a large subset of her generation. 
When counsel met Vickie’s mother, she was unemployed, 
“tweaking” methamphetamine,96 alienated from the family, and 
living alone in a shack without running water or electricity. Vickie’s 
father had absconded to Texas to avoid arrest for gang-related 
activities.97 
 
 94. In this respect, Vickie’s caretakers were not fulfilling the role of “parents,” whose 
“primary responsibility” is to “provid[e] for the adequate and reasonable needs of their children.” 
In re Marriage of Padilla, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555, 560 (Ct. App. 1995) (footnote omitted). “This 
duty rests on fundamental natural laws and has always been recognized by the courts in the 
absence of any statute declaring it.” Lewis v. Lewis, 163 P. 42, 44 (Cal. 1917). 
 95. The main welfare program in California for families with children is called CalWORKs. 
With exceptions that are beyond the scope of this Article, section 11454 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code, imposes a lifetime eligibility limit on adults of 48 months. CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE § 11454 (West 2014). There is no time limit on benefits to children. Unemployed parents 
without savings who have exhausted their lifetime limit must live off their children’s benefits. 
 96. Professor Robert C. Fellmeth at the University of San Diego School of Law reports that 
methamphetamine addiction of parents is increasingly the major factor leading to child removals 
in dependency court. He believes that more than 50 percent of the neglect cases in the courts of 
the highly populated California counties implicate such addiction by one or both parents. “This 
correlation, although shocking, is generally not popularly known—partly because of the generally 
concealed format of those courts and cloaking the plight of those children.” Interview with Robert 
C. Fellmeth, Professor, University of San Diego School of Law, in San Diego, Cal. (Feb. 15, 
2015). 
 97. In 2014, the child poverty rate was 45.8 percent for children in single-parent households. 
Rachel Sheffield, Child Poverty Rate Five Times Lower in Married-Parent Homes, DAILY 
SIGNAL (Sept. 26, 2014), http://dailysignal.com/2014/09/26/child-poverty-rate-five-times-lower-
married-parent-homes. For children in married-parent households, the child poverty rate was 
nearly a fifth of that amount, or 9.5 percent. Id. “For children living with a single parent . . . 
income is the single most important factor in accounting for their lower well-being as compared 
with children living with both parents.” SARAH MCLANAHAN & GARY D. SANDEFUR, GROWING 
UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 134 (1994). As common sense would 
suggest, “[c]hild poverty . . . adversely impacts health across the life course and into adulthood.” 
AAP Agenda for Children Strategic Plan Poverty and Child Health, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, 
http://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-facts/AAP-Agenda-for-Children-Strategic-Plan/ 
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None of the adults in the family demonstrated more than a 
casual commitment to the truth. Vickie’s house was a wreck with 
debris piled to the ceiling and pushing up against the doors. 
Relationships within the house were also a wreck. Vickie’s great 
grandmother was in her late fifties. Only her name was on the lease, 
a fact she used for leverage over everyone else in the family. 
The probate court reappointed98 counsel for Vickie when she 
was four, after her mother filed a petition to terminate the 
grandmother’s guardianship.99 As the probate court has traditionally 
seen these cases, its choices were either to leave Vickie with her 
grandmother, appoint another family member as successor guardian, 
or send Vickie back to her mother. None of these options would have 
produced much benefit for Vickie, since the family members were all 
pretty much the same. 
Like a child in juvenile dependency court, Vickie needed a case 
plan100 to resolve the family’s parenting issues. Problems like 
substance abuse, lying as a way of life, refusing to work, and 
disorganization cannot be resolved by passing custody back and forth 
within the family when all the adults for at least three generations 
have more or less the same problems.101 
 
Pages/AAP-Agenda-for-Children-Strategic-Plan-Poverty-Child-Health.aspx (last visited Aug. 22, 
2016); see Jason M. Lindo & Jessamyn Schaller, Economic Determinants of Child Maltreatment, 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, ENCYC. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2016), http://people. 
tamu.edu/~jlindo/EncyclopediaChildAbuse_PrePubVer.pdf. See generally infra notes 147, 149, 
and 201 (addressing some of the ways that poverty puts children at risk). 
 98. Los Angeles County’s probate court uses a form of “limited scope representation.” See 
supra notes 7, 30, and 49; infra notes 180181 and accompanying text. The court appoints 
counsel for children for specified purposes, “relieves” counsel after he or she has served those 
purposes, and reappoints counsel as the need arises. Once counsel has been relieved, children like 
Vickie are at the mercy of their caretakers. It does not have to be that way. Some counties appoint 
"court visitors" to track and review guardianships. See Judicial Council form GC-248 (explaining 
"court visitors"). In Vickie’s case, the court had relieved counsel after appointing her maternal 
grandmother as guardian, and reappointed counsel when Vickie’s mother filed her petition to 
terminate the maternal grandmother’s guardianship. 
 99. The court may terminate a guardianship “if the court determines that it is in the ward’s 
best interest to terminate the guardianship.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 1601 (West 2002); In re 
Guardianship of L.V., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 894, 901 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that “the best interest of 
the child is the sole criterion for termination of a guardianship.”). The burden is upon the parent 
“to show sufficient overall fitness to justify the termination of the guardianship.” Guardianship of 
Simpson, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 392 (Ct. App. 1998). The trial court must evaluate the parent’s 
fitness in the context of whether changed circumstances justify a change in custody. Guardianship 
of Kassandra, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668, 675 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 100. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 101. See Marieke Van de Rakt et al., Association of Criminal Convictions Between Family 
Members: Effects of Siblings, Fathers, and Mothers, 19 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 
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Although she was still bright and sometimes sweet, Vickie was 
already going downhill: She was defiant. She would have tantrums, 
scream at adults, get violent, and destroy property. She could not 
focus at preschool. “I will not” was her signature phrase. She was 
Veronica Beltran in the making. The first step on the road to change 
was to find—or make—better parents to raise her right. 
Vickie’s court-appointed lawyer hired Veronica’s LCSW to 
develop a case plan and to work with Vickie and her relatives. The 
LCSW cares about these kids at least as much as their lawyer, and 
once again charged very little. The LCSW persuaded Veronica’s 
mother to dismiss her petition and refile it after completing the case 
plan. The case plan required her mother to complete a course called 
“Positive Parenting Program” with good reviews from the 
clinician,102 complete a specified drug treatment program, submit 
clean random drug test results at least once a week for not less than 
six months, get a job,103 and rent a habitable home apart from the 
grandmother and great grandmother. 
Positive Parenting Program takes an evidence-based104 
therapeutic approach to teaching parenting skills. It is a systematic 
protocol designed to prevent and treat behavioral and emotional 
problems in children and teenagers. Its goal is to create family 
environments that encourage children to realize their potential—
something that could make a contribution to the world in Vickie’s 
case, given her native intelligence.105 
 
94108 (2009) (concluding that a “cycle of deprivation” reproduces undesirable behaviors 
through the generations and that children learn most of their behaviors by imitating or modeling 
the behaviors of their parents or primary care giver); Van Meurs et al., supra note 68 (reporting 
research finding that children reared in unstable environments surrounded by drugs, alcohol, 
sexual abuse or domestic violence are much more likely to create similar environments for their 
children because that kind of environment seems right to them); infra note 133 (discussing 
neighborhood effects); see also supra note 12 and infra notes 145, 154155 and accompanying 
text (noting possible impacts on children of socioeconomic factors such as parental education, 
income, and incarceration). 
 102. For a description of the program, see Triple P in a Nutshell, TRIPLE P, 
http://www.triplep.net/glo-en/find-out-about-triple-p/triple-p-in-a-nutshell (last visited Aug. 20, 
2016), and supra notes 59, 71–72. But see Olga Khazan, Welcome to Parent College: Can 
Parenting Classes Help End America’s Disgraceful Child-Abuse Epidemic?, ATLANTIC (Mar.  
16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/03/welcome-to-parent-college/473484 
(questioning data supporting effectiveness of Positive Parenting Program). 
 103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text regarding the risks that poverty presents to 
children. 
 104. See supra note 72 and infra note 105 regarding the importance of evidence-based 
therapy. 
 105. For resources on evidence-based therapeutic intervention, see Tools and Resources,  
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Positive Parenting taught Vickie’s mother that she and Vickie 
are a dyad. As a mother, her responsibility is to provide a peaceful, 
structured environment in which Vickie can grow up. Behavior 
should produce logical, natural consequences, which should teach 
children to think before they act. A child learns not to throw toys 
when she will not get them back for a long time if she does. A child 
learns to behave better when bad behavior leads to a timeout. 
Positive Parenting also taught Vickie’s mother to intervene, 
using skills like redirection and “active ignoring,” long before 
Vickie’s behavior spiraled into a tantrum. Redirection involves an 
active effort to get the child to focus on something other than the 
cause of the problem. “Active ignoring” restores consciousness. “I 
am ignoring you,” the parent tells the child, “until you get dressed.” 
Or, further down the road, “I’m ignoring you until you stop 
screaming.” 
Vickie’s mother proved to be a great student because she is 
smart and naturally peaceful. She completed the drug program and 
brought along her drug-addicted boyfriend, who also completed the 
program and tested clean for eighteen months. They both attended 
outpatient therapy to identify and address the issues that drove them 
to drug abuse in the first place. Her mother got a job as a baker at an 
industrial bakery on the eastern fringe of Los Angeles County. And 
she and her boyfriend rented their own apartment. 
Vickie’s mother filed a new petition to terminate guardianship 
after she completed her case plan. The LCSW then mediated a safety 
plan between Vickie’s mother and grandmother designed both to 
enlist Vickie’s grandmother’s support and to consolidate and to 
reinforce the mother’s gains during her first six months of custody. 
The mediation itself was important in enlisting Grandma’s support 
because it showed her that she remained important to Vickie—
knowledge she needed in order to support the termination of the 
guardianship. 
Vickie’s mother, grandmother, and the LCSW worked out a plan 
that required Vickie’s mother and her boyfriend to continue to 
submit to random drug tests for another six months, to attend 
Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings with a sponsor at least once a 
 
 
CAL. EVIDENCE-BASED CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.cebc4cw.org/implementing-programs/ 
tools (last visited Aug. 22, 2016). 
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week, and to meet with the LCSW at her mother’s expense as often 
as necessary, but not less than once a month, for as long as the 
LCSW deems necessary. 
This safety plan became a court order when the probate court 
attached it to its order terminating guardianship. Vickie’s mother 
continues to test negative for drugs and to attend NA groups at least 
weekly. The plan has provided Vickie’s mother with a level of 
support and resources in times of difficulty that might otherwise have 
led to a downward spiral. For example, when one of Vickie’s 
mother’s half-brothers unexpectedly died, the LCSW was able to 
provide emotional support that other family members could not 
provide. The LCSW was also able to redirect Vickie’s mother to her 
own support network through church, NA, and other friends. When 
she lost some shifts at work and was concerned about making rent 
and utilities one month, the LCSW was able to provide referrals for 
assistance with food, clothing and bills, allowing her to remain 
confident in her ability to provide for the family. Though Vickie’s 
mother did not avail herself of these resources, the knowledge that 
she had a soft and safe place to fall has prevented a downward spiral 
that could have derailed Vickie’s life once again. 
D.  Fess Williams106 
Fess Williams was seventeen by the time his parents reached 
divorce court,107 with less than a year to go before the family court 
lost jurisdiction over him.108 He is a highly intelligent, articulate, and 
 
 106. This Article uses pseudonyms for all parents and children and does not cite documents in 
any court file. Supra note 3. 
 107. Discord surrounding divorce is usually stressful for children who are faced with 
conflicted loyalties. Even when the fight for loyalty is not overt, young children often believe that 
they are somehow responsible for the conflict. See generally JUDITH WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE 
UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY (2000) (showing that one 
third of children of divorce had serious psychological problems that persisted into adulthood); 
Marsha Garrison, Promoting Cooperative Parenting: Programs and Prospects, 9 J. L. & FAM. 
STUD. 265, 26567 (2007) (finding that parental conflict continues to hurt children even after the 
parents’ final separation); Paul R. Amato & Jacob Cheadle, The Long Reach of Divorce: Divorce 
& Child Well-Being Across Three Generations, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 191, 19192 (2005) 
(stating that grandchildren of divorced grandparents show higher rates of marital discord, divorce, 
and tension in early parent-child relationships, and lower rates of educational attainment); 
Sharlene Wolchik et al., Events of Parental Divorce: Stressfulness Ratings by Children, Parents, 
and Clinicians, 14 AM. J. COMM. PSYCHOL. 59, 7273 (1986) (noting that divorce is almost 
always hard on children). 
 108. “The family court may . . . make an order for the custody of a child during minority.” 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3022 (West 2004). Under California law, a minor is an individual who is 
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insightful young man, but he started to fail classes in middle school. 
By tenth grade, he had basically stopped going to school. Fess’s only 
sibling, a sister who is two years older than he is, had very similar 
academic problems. 
Divorce has limited relevance to children with two incompetent 
parents because divorce cannot make either parent competent. 
Parenting training and counseling can improve the situation for kids 
like Veronica Beltran and Victoria Cienfuegos. Nonparent caretakers 
are an option for kids like Anquan Paul and Esteban Santa Cruz. But 
for Fess Williams, it was too late for any of that. 
Fess’s school psychologist had ruled out an emotional, 
behavioral, or psychiatric impairment as the cause of Fess’s 
academic difficulties.109 Fess attributed his lack of success to “being 
lazy and procrastinating.” In exploring with an LCSW what 
happened when he attempted to study, however, Fess described a 
process in which he had difficulty concentrating and lost focus. His 
mind would wander to the stresses110 of his family and related losses, 
which led him to struggle to complete his work. In turn, he felt “bad 
about [himself]” because he did “not like not doing well in 
school.”111 
Fess’s parents separated shortly before Fess started high school. 
 
 
under eighteen years of age. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6500 (West 2013). 
 109. The psychologist did not attempt to rule out depression even though Fess had 
experienced not only the loss of his parents’ marriage and school but also the loss of close 
friendships. A student with an emotional disturbance may qualify for special educational services 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). See, e.g., Lapides v. Coto, 
198788 EHLR DEC. 559:387 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Under 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (c)(4)(i)(D) (2006), 
Emotional disturbance under the IDEA includes “a general pervasive mood of unhappiness or 
depression.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.8 (2006). School psychologists who are interested in protecting their 
schools’ budgets have a financial incentive not to find qualifying impairments because special 
education costs money. Fess could have litigated this issue, albeit not in family court, but Team 
Decision Making (TDM) went in a different direction. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 110. For research and literature on children and traumatic stress, see Child Traumatic Stress, 
NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, http://kb.nctsn.org/SPT/SPT-BrowseResources. 
php?ParentId=183 (last visited Aug. 20, 2016). 
 111. Academic problems are well documented in children of divorce, especially when parents 
are poor role models or fail to provide necessary support. Plummeting grades cause a resistance to 
academics resulting in lowered self-image. This paradigm becomes cyclical: (1) poor grades, (2) 
self-identification of being “stupid,” (3) resistance to school, (4) poor grades as a result of 
accepting the status quo. If there is no detection or intervention to identify the problem, the 
behavior may be perpetuated throughout the child’s educational experience. School phobias, 
truancy or actual dropping-out may be the end result if successful intervention does not take 
place. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN 
AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 184 (1980). 
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Fess and his sister decided to stay with their father. At his father’s 
suggestion, Fess transferred before his junior year to an “Independent 
Study” school. Fess’s father made it his mission to raise Fess’s 
grades if it killed both of them, and Fess did well enough during the 
first marking period in every class but English, which he failed. But 
the improvement in his grades came at the expense of Fess’s 
relationship with his father. 
Sensing an opportunity to salvage a relationship with at least one 
child, Fess’s mother invited Fess to come live with her and his 
maternal grandmother, an unemployed woman who had struggled for 
decades with a serious drinking problem. Fess’s mother and 
grandmother rented a home in a trailer park about 15 miles from the 
father’s home. When Fess accepted his mother’s invitation, she 
proceeded to rent a room for him in what she called a “safe house” 
near Fess’s school, where Fess could wait for her to pick him up after 
work and bring him home. With the “safe house,” Fess would never 
see his father. 
The case arrived in court when Fess’s father filed a Request for 
Order112 to reverse this situation. The hearing took place after Fess’s 
first semester in his mother’s home. Fess’s father contended that Fess 
could not succeed at school in his mother’s custody for a variety of 
reasons. Fess’s mother responded that in fact, Fess was attending 
school and passing all of his classes, which for him would have been 
a giant step forward. 
It turned out that Fess had gotten zeros on most of his 
assignments in three of his four classes, but the laws governing 
grades and attendance in Independent Study schools made those 
zeros irrelevant. Under State law, “attendance” at Independent Study 
schools has nothing to do with occupying a seat in class. Instead, 
Independent Study schools award credit for attendance in proportion 
to “evaluated work.” A student can therefore get credit for perfect 
attendance without ever attending class.113 
 
 112. In relevant part, rule 5.92(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court states: “In a family law 
proceeding other than an action under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act or a local child 
support agency action under the Family Code, a notice of motion or order to show cause must be 
filed on a Request for Order (form FL300), unless another Judicial Council form has been 
adopted or approved for the specific motion or order to show cause.” CAL. R. CT. 5.92(a)(1) 
(2016). 
 113. CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC., Attendance Accounting and the Audit Trail, in INDEPENDENT 
 STUDY OPERATIONS MANUAL 81 (2014), http://www.cde.ca.gov/sp/eo/is/documents/chapter 
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“The only item[s] that count . . . for . . . evaluated work,” 
moreover, are assignments “completed . . . by the due dates 
established in the written agreement” between the student and the 
teacher.114 Independent Study schools interpret that passage to mean 
that zeros do not count against a student’s grade point average or 
attendance. Fess received credit for perfect attendance because he 
received passing scores on the work he completed. In theory, these 
standards allow students to progress at their own pace.115 
By the standards of a traditional high school, Fess would have 
flunked every class except one and received the worst overall grade 
point average of his life. But Independent Study standards allowed 
Fess to report a passing grade in all four of his classes and perfect 
attendance while he lived with his mother. By not completing his 
assignments, however, Fess earned very few academic credits. At 
Fess’s pace during his semester with his mother, he would have been 
lucky to graduate from high school before he reached retirement age. 
For Fess, the answer was Team Decision Making (TDM).116 At 
Fess’s lawyer’s request, the court ordered his parents to retain an 
LCSW to coordinate TDM, an effective low-cost mechanism to bring 
together community resources immediately to meet children’s 
needs.117 TDM operates on the principle that sometimes “it takes a 
 
 
8.pdf [hereinafter Attendance Accounting]; see CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 51740, 51745–51749.5 
(West 2006); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, § 11700 (2016) et seq. For a fuller understanding of 
independent study in California’s public schools, see Independent Study, CAL. DEP’T EDUC., 
http://www.cde.ca.gov/sp/eo/is/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2016). See Independent Study—
CalEdFacts, CAL. DEP’T EDUC., http://www.cde.ca.gov/sp/eo/is/cefindependentst.asp (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2016); Independent Study Operations Manual, CAL. DEP’T EDUC., http://www.cde. 
ca.gov/sp/eo/is/isoperationsmanual.asp (last visited Aug. 22, 2016). 
 114. Attendance Accounting, supra note 113, at 81. 
 115. Id. 
 116. “[U]nauthorised absence [from school] is an ongoing concern that has generally proved 
remarkably resistant to all kinds of innovative approaches, especially in the most severe cases.” 
Carol Hayden, Family Group Conferences—Are They an Effective and Viable Way of Working 
with Attendance and Behaviour Problems in Schools, 35 BRIT. EDUC. RES. J. 205 (2009). 
Children with the most problems with school are “likely to need support that recognizes the wider 
influences on these issues.” Id. Team Decision Making is “a viable approach . . . that may be 
effective in individual cases.” Id.; see infra note 117. 
 117. Team Decision Making, sometimes called Family Group Decision Making and Family 
Group Conferencing, seeks to expand the concept of “family” to include anyone with a  
significant relationship to the child in order to gain a broader range of perspectives and increase 
the potential supports available to the family. See generally FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING: 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNITY-CENTERED CHILD AND FAMILY PRACTICE (Joe Hudson & 
Gale Burford eds., 2000) (discussing “community-centered” approaches to child welfare 
services). 
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whole village to raise a child.”118 
Through the TDM process, it became immediately apparent that 
inappropriate parenting largely explained the disparity between 
Fess’s aptitude and his grades. Fess’s father had an authoritarian 
parenting style, combining high expectations for compliance with 
parental rules and directions with low regard for input from the child 
who was subject to those rules.119 He attributed Fess’s success during 
his last semester under his care to this parenting style, citing 
examples in which he “basically forced” Fess to complete school 
work. Fess’s father is a very straightforward man who calls it “like it 
is.” He called Fess a “fuckhead” during a disagreement, for example, 
because that is how he viewed Fess’s behavior. Fess’s father 
expressed tremendous frustration with Fess’s lack of school 
performance; he had no patience for Fess’s “mood swings.” 
Fess’s mother, by contrast, presented with a permissive 
parenting style, making few demands, being lenient, and taking on 
the status of a friend more than that of a parent.120 She was also 
permissive with herself. Both her home and her life were in disarray. 
She admitted to relying on Fess for support both during and after the 
marriage. Fess was “the man of the house.” He felt it was his role to 
support his mother as she had few friends and needed his support. 
What Fess needed was supplemental parenting.121 Through the 
TDM process, the LCSW found it at Fess’s church, in the person of a 
youth pastor. Churches are an existing but underused low-cost 
community resource. Fess and the pastor agreed to meet weekly with 
two peers with similar issues. The pastor insisted that Fess start 
small, doing little things first before they snowball into big things. 
He focused on expectations, scheduling, and consequences. He 
 
 118. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE (1996) (quoting an Igbo and Yoruba 
(Nigerian) proverb in discussing children and family values). Aaron H’s biography, summarized 
infra at Part III, would support the opposite conclusion: that it can take a village to ruin a child. 
 119. Authoritarian parents fail to explain the reasoning behind their rules. If asked to explain, 
the parent might simply reply, “Because I said so.” These parents have high demands but are not 
responsive to their children. Diana Baumrind, The Influence of Parenting Style on Adolescent 
Competence and Substance Use, 11 J. EARLY ADOLESCENCE 56, 73 (1991). 
 120. Permissive parents rarely discipline their children because they have relatively low 
expectations of maturity and self-control. They often take on the status of a friend more than that 
of a parent. Id. 
 121. For a discussion of a child’s need for outside support when parents are inept, see SUNAR 
L. LUTHAT ET. AL., RESILIENCE AND VULNERABILITY: ADAPTATION IN THE CONTEXT OF 
CHILDHOOD ADVERSITIES 203, 299, 524, 538 (2003). See supra notes 49, 7173 and 102105 
regarding the importance of well-structured parent education. 
 
36 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1 
wanted to know what Fess has done, not why he did not do it. He 
developed rules and guidelines for Fess to follow, and helped Fess 
identify previously effective study skills, such as breaking down each 
two weeks’ worth of assignments into daily tasks for completion. 
Fess’s parents agreed to enroll in therapy to address parenting 
issues and ideally to adopt the same—or at least compatible—
parenting styles. Both parents also agreed to engage in parallel 
parenting as opposed to co-parenting.122 The parents have not done 
these things, but they have stopped asking Fess to share what 
happened in the home of the other parent, and now redirect any 
discussion of his difficulties with the other parent to his church 
supports or the LCSW. 
For the last two marking periods, Fess has completed all of his 
assignments and passed all of his classes with scores ranging from 
84% to 98%. He has begun to visit his father. And he continues to 
see the LCSW as needed. 
E.  Gerard Doherty123 
Team Decision Making also makes it possible to incorporate 
collateral relatives into a parenting plan to keep a child safe and 
ensure that parenting arrangements remain appropriate. 
When his lawyer first met him, Gerry Doherty looked just like 
the boy in the old Oscar Mayer commercial for bologna, only cuter 
(“My bologna has a first name. It’s O-S-C-A-R . . .”). But he was 
and is a wary little boy. He thinks carefully before answering 
questions, and he avoids issues that make him uncomfortable. 
Both of his parents denied problems with drugs, but public 
databases showed that Gerard’s mother had been convicted of a 
series of drug-related theft crimes leading to a six-month prison term 
in 2011. Gerard’s father presented a certificate from federal court 
purporting to show that he had no criminal contacts, but public 
databases showed that in fact he had six arrests. The docket sheet in 
the most recent case showed that he had completed a formal 
diversion program to avoid a drug conviction. 
At minor’s counsel’s request, the family court ordered both 
 
 122. See supra notes 8180 and accompanying text. 
 123. This Article uses pseudonyms for all parents and children and does not cite documents in 
any court file. Supra note 3. 
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parents to submit to random drug testing.124 Gerard’s mother was 
arrested for possession of opiates the day before the next hearing in 
family court, and she spent most of the next two years in prison. 
Gerard’s father had completed only one random test by the next 
family court hearing, but somehow persuaded the test site to report 
that he was in full compliance with the court’s testing orders. The 
one test was negative. 
So on June 4, 2012, the court awarded sole legal and physical 
custody to Gerard’s father. Because Gerard was now alone with his 
father under questionable conditions, minor’s counsel tracked down 
Gerard’s paternal grandfather in another state to ask for suggestions. 
He sent counsel a letter that reads in part: 
Gerard lived in our home for approximately 7 months Oct 
2010 to May 2011 to aid in the recovery of [Gerard’s 
father] from drugs and alcohol. Upon arrival to our 
home . . . , Gerard was in quite a distressed state for such a 
young child. Extremely . . . frightened, scared that he would 
be left alone, and constantly worrying about both his 
parents. His diet consisted of 6-8 hard-boiled eggs a day, 
with cereal occasionally. 
 
If his behavior were corrected, he would run and hide in his 
room behind his bed or behind the curtains. He could not 
play a board game (shoots [sic] and ladders) without 
knocking game board over and throwing himself on the 
ground and pouting. He would panic when he went in the 
car . . . . “We are not going on freeway are we??” Then he 
would cry. This was from his experiences of being used to 
Pan Handle at the Glendale mall with his parents. 
 
During the seven months he was in our home, [Gerard’s 
father] was preoccupied and left in early am and returned in 
the midnight hours daily . . . . He [was] so exhausted at 
night that he refuse[d] to get up and use the restroom. He 
 
 124. When it finds by “a preponderance of the evidence” that there is the “habitual, frequent, 
or continual illegal use of controlled substances” by a person seeking custody, a family court or 
probate court may order the “least intrusive” method of drug testing. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041.5 
(West 2004). Test results may not be used for any purpose other than to assist the court in 
allocating custody and visitation. Id. 
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urinate[d] in drinking glasses. 
 
Gerard [and Gerard’s father] returned to California around 
the end of May or early June 201[1], as [Gerard’s father] 
was drinking again, took my car, left Gerard someplace and 
came home intoxicated with Gerard smelling [of] alcohol 
and was told that he would not be allowed to drive our 
vehicles any longer. 
 
During the time that Gerard was here . . . , we often had 
visits by [the maternal grandparents and maternal aunt.] 
Their love for Gerard is without question . . . . They made 
every possible effort to keep in touch. They called almost 
every day and sent pictures and photo albums of visits, 
along with biweekly video chats with his aunt. 
After reading this letter, Gerard’s lawyer contacted Gerard’s 
maternal relatives, gave them a copy of the paternal grandfather’s 
letter, and directed them to the free Self-Help Center at the 
courthouse for help filing a petition for visitation rights.125 The 
following week, a team comprising Gerard’s maternal and paternal 
grandparents, father, and lawyer worked out a regular visitation 
schedule for his maternal relatives based on the understanding that 
Gerard’s safety comes first. Like churches, extended family members 
are an existing but underused low-cost community resource. 
Almost exactly two years later, in June 2014, an anonymous 
caller called 911 to report that a man had overdosed on drugs and 
was lying face down inside his house. The man was Gerard’s father. 
When help arrived, Gerard was alone with his unconscious father. 
Gerard’s parenting plan was no longer appropriate. 
Gerard’s maternal relatives contacted his lawyer the next day. 
They had heard what happened, and could not find Gerard. 
Suspecting that Gerard would turn up in juvenile dependency 
court,126 minor’s counsel advised them to call the Child Abuse 
 
 125. The Los Angeles Superior Court operates “Self-Help & Resource Centers for Self-
Represented Litigants” to provide education and assistance to parties who do not have attorneys 
and need to complete documents and court procedures on their own. Los Angeles Superior Court 
Resource Center for Self-Represented Litigants, L.A. SUPER. CT. (2016), http://www.lacourt.org/ 
laselfhelp/UI/index.aspx?model=1. 
 126. Juvenile dependency courts operate behind an iron curtain of confidentiality. California 
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 346 and 827 and California Rule of Court 5.530 establish 
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Hotline immediately, and to drive to dependency court that day and 
every day for the next three days to see what they could discover.127 
Gerard’s maternal relatives were waiting in juvenile dependency 
court when his case arrived. The court placed Gerard with them, 
where he remains to date. The transition was seamless. 
IV.  A LIFE IN THE BALANCE 
Michael Lewis’ The Blind Side: Evolution of a Game128 meets 
Nina Bernstein’s The Lost Children of Wilder129 in the biography of 
Aaron H.130 If ever a child were the product of his environment, then 
Aaron is. Ironically, it is the environment that Los Angeles County’s 
juvenile dependency system chose for him when he was nine days 
old131 and ratified every six months until the court washed its hands 
 
who has automatic access to juvenile dependency court files and proceedings as well as the 
process for other parties to follow to request access. Gerard’s relatives did not have automatic 
access, and did not have time to petition the court to find out what was happening with him. See 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 346, 827 (West 2016); CAL. R. CT. 5.530 (2016). 
 127. A county’s department of child protective services (CPS) must file a petition in juvenile 
dependency court within 48 hours of a child’s removal from his or her home, not including non-
judicial days, to “declare” the child a dependent of the court, or release the child to his or her 
parents. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 313 (West. 2016). The juvenile court must hold an “initial 
hearing” (known as a “detention hearing”) no later than the next judicial day. Id. § 315; CAL. R. 
CT. 5.501–.504, 5.668 (2016). 
 128. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BLIND SIDE: EVOLUTION OF A GAME (2006). 
 129. NINA BERNSTEIN, THE LOST CHILDREN OF WILDER: THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CHANGE 
FOSTER CARE (2001). 
 130. This Article uses pseudonyms for all parents and children and does not cite documents in 
any court file. Supra note 3. 
 131. In its 1999–2000 report, the Los Angeles County Civil Grand Jury excoriated the 
County’s foster care system, observing that “[t]he best interests of the child are rarely paramount 
in considering the placement options for children in the system.” 1999–2000 L.A. COUNTY 
GRAND JURY FINAL REP. (2000), http://grandjury.co.la.ca.us/x1z2.pdf. In April 2012, Los 
Angeles County’s Children’s Special Investigations Unit delivered to the Board of Supervisors 
the Report Regarding DCFS Recurring Systemic Issues, which identified at least 13 child deaths 
that might have been prevented if Respondents had taken basic steps to assess risks. CHILDREN’S 
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION UNIT, L.A. CTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS, REPORT REGARDING DCFS 
RECURRING SYSTEMIC ISSUES 1, 11 (2012), http://documents.latimes.com/report-severe- 
problems-los-angeles-county-department-children-and-family-services. The report said the 
situation was akin to “the blind leading the blind,” with workers rarely held accountable for 
“egregious” errors. Id. at 66, 69. As recently as April 18, 2014, Los Angeles County’s Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Child Protection issued a report concluding that “judges confirmed that 
the judicial system operates under the burden of too many cases and, at times, incomplete or 
inaccurate information.” L.A. CTY. BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON CHILD PROT., THE ROAD TO 
SAFETY FOR OUR CHILDREN i (2014), http://ceo.lacounty.gov/pdf/brc/BRCCP_Final_Report_ 
April_18_2014.pdf. One recent study questions whether foster care has produced any measurable 
improvement anywhere in the lives of children. Kristine A. Campbell et al., Household, Family, 
and Child Risk Factors After an Investigation for Suspected Child Maltreatment: A Missed 
Opportunity for Prevention, 164 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 943 (2010). 
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of the case eleven years later.132 
Whatever else they might be, the south and east sides of Los 
Angeles are also gang territory. In many of their neighborhoods,133 
the gang participation rate for teenagers and young adults approaches 
one-hundred percent.134 Gang “participation” covers a broad 
spectrum of involvement, but it’s never a good thing.135 Very few 
issues matter more to the children who live in gang-infested 
neighborhoods.136 
One neighborhood in south Los Angeles is called “Death Alley” 
because it has the highest homicide rate in the County.137 The 
dependency court placed Aaron H. at ground zero on Death Alley, 
less than two blocks from the corner of Century Boulevard and 
 
 132. Aaron’s foster care file would undoubtedly confirm this chronology, but DCFS’s records 
may not be excerpted without the permission of the juvenile court, and those records must be 
filed under seal in family court. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 827 (West 2016); see id. § 827.10. 
The juvenile court granted the author’s request to review Aaron’s court file on the condition that 
he not take any notes. 
 133. See Dafna E. Kohen et al., Neighborhood Disadvantage: Pathways of Effects for Young 
Children, 79 CHILD DEV. 156, 164 (2008). 
[N]eighborhood disadvantage manifests its effect via lower neighborhood cohesion, 
which, in turn, may interfere with processes that promote parenting practices 
associated with child competence and positive adjustment. 
 
[R]esidence in a poor and disorganized neighborhood was associated with maternal 
depression and family dysfunction. Compromised parental and family well-being, in 
turn, were associated with lower quality parenting (i.e., less stimulation, less 
consistency, and more punitiveness) and negative child outcomes. Thus, our findings 
reveal that neighborhood-level economic and social hardship operate in a similar 
fashion to family-level disadvantage in creating conditions that stress the family unit 
and ultimately impact children. 
Id. (citations omitted); see infra, note 149. 
 134. See A Call to Action: A Case for a Comprehensive Solution to LA’s Gang Violence 
Epidemic, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://advancementprojectca.org/ap-publications/a-call-to-
action-the-case-for-comprehensive-solutions-to-l-a-s-gang-epidemic (last visited Aug. 22, 2016) 
(including contributions from 47 subject matter experts, this report concludes that “the petri dish 
of Los Angeles’ high crime neighborhoods has spawned a violent gang culture unlike any other” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 135. Only a very small percentage of school-aged gang members engage in serious or violent 
crimes that would get them arrested or listed on law enforcement databases. See James C. Howell 
et al., The Changing Boundaries of Youth Gangs, in GANGS IN AMERICA 31 (2002); G. David 
Curry, Self-Reported Gang Involvement and Officially Recorded Delinquency, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 
1253 (2000). 
 136. Interview with Rafer Owens, Pastor, Faith Inspirational Missionary Baptist Church in 
Compton, Californi aand for the last twenty-two years, Deputy Sheriff for the County of Los 
Angeles stationed in Compton (Feb. 15, 2015). 
 137. Nicole Santa Cruz & Ken Schwenke, South Vermont Avenue: L.A. County’s Death Alley, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2014), http://homicide.latimes.com/post/westmont-homicides (reporting that 
“[s]ixty people have been killed along this corridor since 2007, most shot to death.”). 
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Vermont Avenue,138 in the same home where his father grew up. 
Aaron’s mother and his other possible father grew up nearby. 
Aaron’s mother and both men who could be his father have 
extensive histories of substance abuse. The man that Aaron calls his 
father spent large chunks of Aaron’s childhood in prison. Aaron has 
never met Alan John,139 his other possible father, who would be 
about seventy-two years old and is sometimes seen on Manchester or 
Slauson Boulevards in south Los Angeles, sometimes in the city of 
Chicago. 
Aaron’s mother nods when she talks, which may be a side effect 
of the psychotropic medication she takes for bipolar disorder, 
depression, and chronic anxiety.140 She has been in and out of jail, 
and insists that “a chemical imbalance” causes her to falsely test 
positive for PCP whenever she smokes a cigarette. She has never had 
a job that she could do with her clothes on. Foster care kept Aaron’s 
mother at a safe distance, but Aaron has not been in foster care since 
he was eleven. 
In 1994, three years before Aaron was born, DCFS opened a 
dependency case against his parents for the “severe neglect” of 
Aaron’s four siblings. Aaron personally entered foster care when he 
was nine days old. The juvenile court placed all five siblings with 
their paternal grandmother and her boyfriend in a home where 
Aaron’s father still lived when he was not locked up. Both the 
grandmother and the boyfriend were hard-core alcoholics who died 
young of alcohol-related causes.141 When Aaron was eleven, after 
both his grandmother and her boyfriend had died, the juvenile court 
terminated its jurisdiction and awarded sole legal and physical 
custody142 to his father. 
 
 138. See Gene H. Brody et al., Neighborhood Disadvantage Moderates Associations of 
Parenting and Older Sibling Problem Attitudes and Behavior with Conduct Disorders in African 
American Children, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICS PSYCHOL., 211 (2003) (concluding that the 
negative effects of disadvantaged neighborhood structural factors and social organization may 
operate through unsupervised peer group activities, “siblings with deviance-prone attitudes,” as 
well as “harsh” and “non-nurturant-involved” parenting.). 
 139. This Article uses pseudonyms for all parents and children and does not cite documents in 
any court file. Supra note 3. 
 140. See BILL EDDY, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY COURT: STRUCTURE, SKILLS AND LESS 
STRESS 77 (2012) (reporting that child custody disputes frequently involve one or more family 
members with a mental health problem). 
 141. Aaron’s father’s theory is that his mother’s boyfriend lived longer than he might have 
because alcohol gave him a reason to live. 
 142. Under the current statutory scheme, legal and physical custody are either “joint” or 
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Foster care did nothing positive for Aaron; apart from keeping 
his mother at bay for a while, foster care really did nothing at all.143 
Aaron and his father still live in the same home. Situated on an alley, 
it has one bedroom in about 250 square feet. Sometimes the house 
has a stench, sometimes it smells better. Aaron’s father inherited his 
mother’s Section 8 certificate144 but remains in the same hut because 
he cannot find another landlord to rent to him. That could be because 
of all the mistakes he has made over the years, starting in high 
school. After he lost interest in football, Aaron’s father joined the 
“Athens Park Bloods” and embarked on a dissolute life. Aaron’s 
father says that his own father offered both a role model and a 
cautionary tale, which may help explain Aaron’s father’s complex 
relationship with Aaron. Aaron’s paternal grandfather spent Aaron’s 
father’s entire childhood in prison.145 
 
“sole”; “‘joint physical custody’ means that each of the parents shall have significant periods of 
physical custody.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 3004 (West 2016). “‘Sole physical custody’ means that a 
child shall reside with and be under the supervision of one parent, subject to the power of the 
court to order visitation.” Id. § 3007. Joint legal custody “means that both parents shall share the 
right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of 
a child.” Id. § 3003. “‘Sole legal custody’ means that one parent” alone has that “right and 
responsibility.” Id. § 3006. 
 143. Children who grow up in foster care are “more likely than their peers to suffer from 
homelessness, be involved in criminal activity, be uneducated, be unemployed, experience 
poverty, and lack proper healthcare.” Melinda Atkinson, Aging Out of Foster Care: Towards a 
Universal Safety Net for Former Foster Care Youth, 43 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 183 (2008). 
California foster children are no exception. See Kristine A. Campbell et al., Household, Family, 
and Child Risk Factors After an Investigation for Suspected Child Maltreatment: A Missed 
Opportunity for Prevention, 164 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 943 (2010). See 
generally Sylvia Junn & Jennifer Rodriguez, Out on Their Own: California’s Foster Youth and 
the Inequalities of the Independent Living Program, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 189 (2002) 
(reporting on California’s attempts to address some of the challenges that children face when they 
grow up in foster care). 
 144. Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 provides a comprehensive program 
of federal housing assistance for low-income persons. Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 
50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 et seq.). The policy is generally 
implemented by direct subsidies to owners of apartments who certify that their tenants meet the 
income requirements of the Act. For a discussion of this provision, see Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 
1261, 1266–69 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 145. Low levels of positive parenting behaviors and high levels of negative parenting 
behaviors have consistently been associated with child behavior problems. Eleanor Emmons 
MacCoby & John A. Martin, Socialization in the Context of the Family: Parent-Child Interaction, 
in 4 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 1–101 (1983). Parents can transmit these problems from 
one generation to the next. Gerald R. Patterson & Karen Yoerger, A Developmental Model for 
Early- and Late-Onset Antisocial Behavior, in ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN AND 
ADOLESCENTS: A DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS AND MODEL FOR INTERVENTION 147–72 (2002). 
Regarding the effects of parental imprisonment, see supra notes 12 and 101 and infra notes 
154155 and accompanying text. 
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Aaron’s brother, Hector Douglass,146 has pointed a way out. 
After earning a football scholarship to a Big 10 university, Hector 
Douglass graduated in 2013 with degrees in sports medicine and 
sociology. He remains in his university town, and he wants no part of 
Los Angeles, Aaron, or the rest of the family he left behind. 
Like his brother, Aaron has above average intelligence and 
prodigious football ability: He was the MVP of the Los Angeles 
Unified School District’s middle school league. His father has the 
trophy to prove it. Aaron can also play some basketball. He can rap, 
and he has some rhymes online even though he does not own any 
electronics, much less any musical instruments. He also has a blog 
even though he does not own a computer. Both the raps and the blog 
make outstanding use of metaphors, though the themes and language 
are deplorable. 
Aaron’s life might have been different if his parents had been 
able to get jobs and stay together, off drugs, and out of prison. When 
DCFS removed Aaron from his parents’ custody immediately after 
he was born, it might have made sense to place him with foster 
parents who did not have so many problems of their own.147 But 
none of that happened. His life might have been different if the 
judges, lawyers, and social workers in the juvenile dependency 
system had actually done something for him, but that did not happen, 
either.148 Aaron’s life would be different now if he would maintain a 
decent grade point average. But Aaron has not maintained the grade 
point average necessary to play high school sports, much less 
graduate.149 
 
 146. This Article uses pseudonyms for all parents and children and does not cite documents in 
any court file. Supra note 3. 
 147. Poverty can perpetuate poverty “generation after generation, by acting on the brain.” 
Madeline Ostrander, What Poverty Does to the Young Brain, NEW YORKER (June 4, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/what-poverty-does-to-the-young-brain (citing studies 
showing that “substandard housing, separation from parent(s), exposure to violence, family 
turmoil, and other forms of extreme stress—can be toxic to the developing brain, just like drug or 
alcohol abuse”); see supra note 97; infra notes 149, 154155, 201. 
 148. In fairness, even the most competent dependency lawyers and social workers with the 
best of intentions have enough on their plates in Los Angeles to choke a horse. In E.T. v. George, 
the plaintiffs documented that staff attorneys for the non-profit agency that serves as court-
appointed counsel for dependent children in Sacramento County carry as many as 395 cases at a 
time. 681 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1156 (E.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). The 
same agency represents children in Los Angeles. 
 149. Academic difficulties are closely correlated with neighborhood and poverty. For a 
comprehensive review of research on the effects of neighborhood poverty and child and 
adolescent well-being, see Tama Leventhal & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, The Neighborhoods They 
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The family court appointed a new lawyer for Aaron in the spring 
of 2013, when his mother filed a parentage action in family court. By 
then, Aaron was sixteen and hard to help. His new lawyer pointed 
Aaron to the excellent charter school operated by Soledad 
Enrichment Action in his neighborhood.150 Aaron’s father ruled that 
out, saying that a boy from his block would not be safe there. School 
personnel confirmed that it would not be safe for Aaron to walk 
across the few blocks between his house and the school. 
So Aaron’s new lawyer provisionally arranged for him to attend 
Bishop Mora Salesian High School,151 a Catholic college preparatory 
school in Boyle Heights. Aaron seemed to like it. He raced his 
lawyer from building to building, up and down the knolls. He found 
a trove of snacks, which the school was happy to share. “[F]or the 
past several years, all of [the school’s] students in every graduating 
class have chosen to continue their education, with over 90% of them 
going on to four-year universities.”152 Tuition would have been free 
because the school charges on a sliding scale according to family 
income, and Aaron’s family had almost no income. 
But neither Aaron nor his father completed their parts of the 
application for admission. Instead, Aaron transferred to Rancho 
Dominguez Preparatory School, a newer high school in Long Beach 
 
Live in: The Effects of Neighborhood Residence on Child and Adolescent Outcomes, 126 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 309 (2000). See also Robert H. Bradley, Environment and Parenting, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF PARENTING 281 (2002) (the ways that a family’s social and physical environment 
can shape parental interactions with children); John E. Richters & Pedro E. Martinez, Violent 
Communities, Family Choices, and Children’s Chances: An Algorithm for Improving the Odds, 5 
DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 609 (1993) (presenting data concerning the early predictors of 
adaptational success and failure among children attending elementary school in a violent 
Washington, D.C. neighborhood); supra notes 97, 133, 147 and infra notes 154155, 201 
(addressing impact on some children of socioeconomic factors such as neighborhood, education, 
income, and parental incarceration). See generally SANDRALUZ LARA-CINISOMO & ANNE R. 
PEBLEY, LOS ANGELES COUNTY YOUNG CHILDREN’S LITERACY EXPERIENCES, EMOTIONAL 
WELL-BEING AND SKILLS ACQUISITION: RESULTS FROM THE LOS ANGELES FAMILY AND 
NEIGHBORHOOD SURVEY (2003), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/drafts/2006/DRU 
3041.pdf (discussing the negative correlation between poor neighborhoods and literacy ); ANNE 
R. PEBLEY & MARY E. VAIANA, IN OUR BACKYARD: HOW 3 L.A. NEIGHBORHOODS AFFECT 
CHILDREN’S LIVES (2002), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/ 
2005/MR1470.pdf (comparing how the Culver Marina, East L.A., and Windsor View 
neighborhoods affect the quality of life of the children who reside in them). 
 150. Programs and Services, SOLEDAD ENRICHMENT ACTION, http://www.seacharter.net/ 
charter-schools/programs-services.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2016). 
 151. See Mission & Philosophy, BISHOP MORA SALESIAN HIGH SCH., http://www.mustangs 
la.org/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=306041&type=d&pREC_ID=707881 (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2016). 
 152. Id. 
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operated by the Los Angeles Unified School District.153 Once again, 
Aaron proceeded to flunk just about everything. 
In September 2015, Aaron transferred to a charter school in 
Watts as a fifth-year freshman. He will never make a legal living on 
the road he’s on.154 He will either collect government benefits for the 
rest of his life, like his parents and grandparents before him, or he 
will make an illegal living.155 
V.  FAMILY CODE § 3153: A PARTIAL ANSWER 
TO LIMITED SCOPE REPRESENTATION AND THE § 2030 CONUNDRUM 
The children in the cases described above had counsel, which 
makes them exceptional. Except in Aaron’s case, counsel made an 
important difference. Family Code section 3150 and Probate Code 
section 1470 give family and probate courts discretion to appoint 
counsel for every poor at-risk kid at public expense,156 but most 
courts never exercise that discretion.157 
In fiscal year 2010, Los Angeles County’s Superior Court 
received claims for payment from attorneys appointed to represent 
poor children in family court totaling more than $5.5 million.158 That 
would have been less than one percent of the Court’s total budget for 
 
 153. See Mission and Vision, RANCHO DOMINGUEZ PREPARATORY SCH., http://rdps-lausd-
ca.schoolloop.com/mission (last visited Aug. 22, 2016). 
 154. See Van de Rakt, supra note 101 (one study has revealed that “fathers are the most 
important relative when it comes to predicting the criminal behavior of their sons”); see also 
supra notes 12 and 145 and infra note 155 (discussing the effects of parental imprisonment); 
supra notes 95, 133, 147 and 149 and infra notes 155 and 201 (providing details on the effects of 
parental education, poverty, and neighborhood). 
 155. Parental education and other family factors are closely correlated with achievement in 
the next generation. Analyses have repeatedly found that mother’s education, father’s education, 
the number of siblings in the family (fewer is better), family income, family health care, the 
number of books in the home, and other, less easily measured characteristics (such as parental 
relationships with the child) together have a major impact on student achievement. Of all these 
factors, the educational attainment of the mother seems to be the single most important, because it 
so directly affects the care the child receives at home. See Derek Neal, How Families and Schools 
Shape the Achievement Gap, in GENERATIONAL CHANGE: CLOSING THE TEST SCORE GAP 10 
(2006); see also supra note 12 (discussing potential negative impacts of parental incarceration). 
 156. See supra notes 59, 49 and accompanying text. 
 157. See infra note 169. Public records show that the family courts in many of California’s 
counties never, or almost never, appoint counsel for children whose parents cannot or will not 
pay. A table showing the counties’ expenditures between FY 2008 and FY 2011 is on file with 
the authors. 
 158. Letter from Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Sylvia White-Irby, 
Administrator, Administrative Records Requests, to Christina Riehl in response to a Public 
Records Act Request (Apr. 9, 2015) (on file with author). 
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fiscal year 20142015,159 but it proved to be more than the County 
was willing to spend on access to justice for at-risk children at the 
center of custody disputes. 
On April 19, 2011—without performing any kind of needs 
assessment—Los Angeles County’s Board of Supervisors directed 
the Los Angeles County Auditor-Controller to work with the Los 
Angeles Superior Court to reduce the cost of minors’ counsel.160 By 
fiscal year 20142015, the family court had cut the cost to 
$1,525,544.161 Comparable figures for probate court are not 
available.162 
With some justification, the court offers budgetary explanations 
for this reduction.163 According to the State Judicial Council’s 
website, “mandated public service reports and periodic surveys 
reflect the severe and growing impact of budget cuts since 2008.”164 
These impacts include fifty-two courthouse closures and 202 
courtroom closures, a reduction of hours at public service counters in 
thirty courts, and limited court service days in fifteen courts.165 
Budgetary explanations, however, obscure at least as much as 
they reveal. The courts166 and the counties167 fund children’s counsel 
 
 159. See Los Angeles Superior Court: Annual Report 2015, SUPER. CT. OF CAL. 24 (2015), 
https://www.lacourt.org/newsmedia/uploads/2015LASCAnnualReport.pdf (reporting a “Total 
Budget” of $627.3 million). The Court also receives funds from other sources. See, e.g., infra 
note 167. 
 160. Letter from the County of Los Angeles County Dep’t of Auditor-Controller to Los 
Angeles County Board of Supervisors (July 28, 2011), http://file.lacounty.gov/auditor/audit_ 
reports/Superior%20Court/cms1_163896.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2016). 
 161. See supra note 158; infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 162. Id. For a possible explanation, see infra notes 166167. 
 163. See infra note 169. 
 164. See In Focus: Judicial Branch Budget Crisis, JUD. BRANCH CAL., 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/1494.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2016). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Since the Legislature passed the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997, 
Assemb. B. 233, 1997 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997), the Judicial Council has distributed court 
funds to the presiding judge of each county, who has sole authority to control expenditures for 
“court operations,” as defined in California Government Code section 77003 and California Rule 
of Court 10.810. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 77003 (West 2005); CAL. R. CT. 10.810 (2016). Under 
California Government Code section 77003(a)(4) and California Rule of Court 10.810(a)(4), 
“court operations” includes “counsel appointed by the court to represent a minor pursuant to 
Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 3150) of Part 2 of Division 8 of the Family Code.” CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 77003(a)(4) (West 2005); CAL. R. CT. 10.810(a)(4) (2016). See generally William 
C. Vickrey et al., Access to Justice: A Broader Perspective, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1147 (2009) 
(encouraging courts to enact a comprehensive and long-term strategy—rather than engaging in 
reactive responses to short-term concerns—to enhance the independence of the judicial branch). 
 167. The cost of counsel appointed for a child in probate court remains payable by the county, 
not the court. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1470(c)(3) (West 2008). The counties therefore continue to 
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in family court and probate court with money they receive from the 
taxpayers through the Judicial Council and county governments.168 
In recent years, the Judicial Council and the counties have refused to 
part with the tax funds necessary to give poor children access to 
justice169 because their priorities are elsewhere.170 
It is not just some parents’ behavior, but also the court system’s 
spending priorities that suggest the disquieting questions in the 
epigraph that opens this article.171 According to California’s State 
Auditor, for example, the Judicial Council was prepared to spend up 
 
receive certain court collections to fund these expenditures. Los Angeles County’s 
“Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports” therefore continue to show expenditures for counsel 
appointed for indigent litigants, but do not break out specific expenditures for counsel appointed 
for children in probate court. Los Angeles County Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 
(CAFR), DEP’T OF AUDITOR-CONTROLLER, http://auditor.lacounty.gov/wps/portal/ac/!ut/p/b0/ 
04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOJdDQwM3P3dgo3cHYOdDTx9nAPMLQ2NDC18TPQ
Lsh0VAcAGwL0! (last visited Aug. 20, 2016). 
 168. See supra notes 166167. 
 169. Phone conversation on February 20, 2015 between author Christina Riehl and Julia 
Weber, JD, MSW, Supervising Attorney, Center for Families, Children & the Courts, Operations 
and Programs Division Judicial Council of California, indicating most courts across the state say 
they can no longer fund the appointment of counsel for kids at the center of custody disputes 
(contemporaneous notes on file in the author’s office). Under our tripartite system of government, 
however, it is the court’s special responsibility to protect people like poor children who have little 
or no political power. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 20304 (1952). In Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 682 P.2d 360 (Cal. 1984), 
the California Supreme Court held that governmental agencies must comply with requirements 
governing the appointment of counsel for poor people, regardless of budgetary constraints: “We 
are aware of the [financial] burden these [requirements] may impose . . . . Nevertheless, relief . . . 
must come through statewide legislation designed to ease such burdens . . . relief cannot be 
attained through retreat from established rules designed to implement indigent [people’s] 
constitutional right [to counsel].” Id. at 362; see infra notes 170 and 191. 
 170. For several years now, the judicial system has balanced its budgets on the backs of poor 
children whose families are disintegrating. Ed Howard of the Children’s Advocacy Institute at the 
University of San Diego believes that this pattern persists “[b]ecause the kids [cannot] 
vote . . . and because the awful consequences happen in secret. You can get straight-up cynical 
about power equaling results.” Sasha Abramsky, The Children Left Behind, CAL. LAW. (Dec. 
2013), http://ww2.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?eid=932274&wteid=932274_The_Children_Left_ 
Behind. But see Scott v. Cty. of L.A., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 654 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 
“[f]inancial limitations of governments have never been, and cannot be, deemed an excuse for a 
public employee’s failure to comply with mandatory duties imposed by law.”). 
 171. In a Rosh Hashanah message posted on September 21, 2014 on the Los Angeles County 
Bar Association’s family law listserv, Alexandra Leichter wrote: 
My experience has taught me that we cannot turn our backs on others who are less 
fortunate than we are. We cannot forget those who cannot afford our fees and our legal 
talents. We cannot walk off happily ensconced with paying clients while there are 
myriads who can afford not even a single hour of our time. That is why I ask each and 
every one of you to look at yourselves and your families and your practices, and your 
good fortune, and let just a little bit of it trickle down to those who have none of that. 
Posting of Alexandra Leichter, Alexandra@LLMFamilyLaw.com, to Los Angeles County Bar 
Association family law listserv (Sept. 21, 2014) (on file with author). 
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to $1.9 billion on an effort to engraft a uniform computer system 
onto the state’s trial courts before scrapping it. The Auditor’s report, 
entitled “The Statewide Case Management Project Faces Significant 
Challenges Due to Poor Project Management” (February 2011 
Report 2010-102), questioned not only the cost but also the utility of 
the project.172 
A separate state audit released on January 7, 2015 found that 
“court leaders” had spent $30 million over the preceding four years 
on “questionable” expenses and salaries.173 For example, the Judicial 
Council paid each of its nine office directors more than the salaries 
for the governor and his top administration staff who “have much 
broader responsibilities.”174 The audit questioned several specific 
expenditures, including an unexplained fleet of sixty-six vehicles 
across the state.175 
At roughly the same time, the Legislature passed legislation to 
enable Los Angeles County’s judges to keep expensive benefits 
packages.176 These extra benefits cost Los Angeles County 
approximately $21 million in fiscal 2007177 and presumably continue 
to cost the county similar amounts every year. Some of the funding 
for current benefits comes from the money the County saves by not 
appointing counsel for at-risk kids. It matters not whether money for 
judges’ benefits comes directly or indirectly from money saved by 
denying children access to justice, since money is fungible. 
The courts also continue to provide enormous incomes to many 
 
 172. Maria Dinzeo, Scathing Audit Blasts $1.9 Billion Court Computer Project in California, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/02/08/ 
34000.htm. On March 27, 2012, the Sacramento Bee reported that the Judicial Council had 
canceled the system. Dan Walters, California Judicial Council Halts Court Case Management 
System, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 27, 2012), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2012/03/ 
california-judicial-council-halts-controversial-court-case-management-system.html. 
 173. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, REPORT 2014-107, JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CALIFORNIA 1 (2015), 
https://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2014-107.pdf. 
 174. Id. at 20. 
 175. Id. at 3233. For a summary of the report, see Patrick McGreevy & Maura Dolan, Audit 
Finds $30 Million in ‘Questionable’ Court Spending and Salaries, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015, 8:19 
PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-courts-audit-20150108-story.html. 
 176. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 68220–68222 (West 2005). See generally Skylar Curtis, 
Government: Chapter 9: Superior Court Judges Allowed to Keep Their Job “Perks” from the 
Counties, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 581 (2010) (examining the legislation allowing California state 
court judges to retain their extra benefits). 
 177. Sturgeon v. Cty. of L.A., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 24648 (Ct. App. 2008) (reporting that 
Los Angeles County judges received as much as $249,413 in salary and benefits in 2007, 
comprising a base salary of $192,386 plus state benefits, county benefits, and other contributions 
that could be exchanged for cash.). 
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parents’ lawyers. No one has cumulated the money that parents’ 
lawyers extract from the family and probate courts, but the total must 
dwarf the money paid to the Judicial Council, judges, and 
administrative staff. Market data on billing rates for lawyers who 
practice in family and probate courts are hard to find, but researchers 
at the University of Houston and the Brookings Institution, 
summarizing data from what they believe to be the first publicly 
available comprehensive data base on attorneys’ fees, concluded that 
the national mean hourly rate for family lawyers was $302.47, with a 
standard deviation of $86.48.178 Recently, California’s Court of 
Appeal affirmed a rate of $1,000 per hour for an attorney in a family 
law case.179 
The Legislature has enabled parents’ lawyers to maintain these 
rates by creating private-sector mechanisms to support them, 
ostensibly in deference to parents’ due process rights.180 The main 
mechanisms are: (1) California Rule of Court 5.425, which 
authorizes “limited scope representation” in family court, and 
(2) Family Code sections 2030 et seq., which authorize the court to 
order one parent to pay the other parent’s attorney’s fees.181 
“Limited scope representation” enables lawyers for parents to 
“unbundle services,” i.e., to represent parents for limited purposes. 
Parents are alleged to benefit on the theory that this enables them to 
pay attorneys’ regular rates for as long as their funds hold out, even 
if they cannot afford to hire a lawyer to handle the whole case.182 
Once parents exhaust their funds, their attorneys are free to withdraw 
from the case, whether or not they have produced any actual benefit 
 
 178. See Vikram Mahershri & Clifford Winston, An Exploratory Study of the Pricing of Legal 
Services, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 169, 16973 (2014). 
 179. Chodos v. Borman, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 889 (Ct. App. 2015). 
 180. See S. Judiciary Comm., Bill Analysis, Assemb. B. 939, 2009–2010 Leg. Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2010) (amending section 2030 of the California Family Code to enable family courts to 
award attorney’s fees and costs to one parent when he or she has less money than the other parent 
because “due process protections” entail “[a]ccess to justice”). See generally Kevin Q. v. Lauren 
W., 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 676, 684 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding that trial courts must ensure that “each 
party has access to legal representation”). 
 181. Section 2030(a) of the California Family Code authorizes the court to order “one party, 
except a governmental entity, to pay to the other party, or to the other party’s attorney, whatever 
amount is reasonably necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending 
the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 2030(a) (West 2016); 
see infra note 184. 
 182. Julie MacFarlane, Forrest Mosten’s Collaborative Divorce Handbook: Effectively 
Helping Divorcing Families Without Going to Court—The Past, Present, and Future of 
Collaborative Law, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 566 (2010). 
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for the client—or the client’s children.183 
Family Code sections 2030 et seq. almost require trial courts to 
order a parent who has counsel to help pay the other parent’s 
attorney’s fees184 at market billing rates185 when the other parent 
cannot afford to do so. The “purpose is parity: a fair hearing with two 
sides equally represented.”186 The results, however, can be more like 
the common-law offenses of barratry187 and “maintenance.”188 
Unnecessary strife between parents is exactly what their children do 
not need.189 That is the section 2030 conundrum—by enabling 
litigation, the courts may be harming the children they should be 
protecting.190 
Whether children have constitutionally protected interests at 
stake in family and probate court is an open question.191 However 
that question is resolved, Family Code section 3153 could do for 
some children what Family Code section 2030 does for some 
parents. Section 3153 authorizes the family courts to appoint counsel 
for children at their parents’ expense—i.e., at no cost to the 
 
 183. CAL. R. CT. 5.425(e) (2016). 
 184. The California Family Code authorizes the court to order one parent to pay the other 
parent’s attorney’s fees, and identify factors and issues for the court to consider when deciding to 
make such an order. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2030, 2032, 3121, 3557, 7505, 7640 (West 2016). 
 185. See Hayes v. Ward, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a “fees award . . . 
should be determined at the reasonable market rate”); see also Blum v. Stenson 465 U.S. 886, 895 
n.11 (1984) (noting that lawyers are entitled to “rates . . . in line with those prevailing in the 
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and 
reputation. A rate determined in this way is normally deemed to be reasonable, and is referred 
to—for convenience—as the prevailing market rate”). 
 186. Alan S. v. Superior Court, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 241, 252 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 187. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “barratry” as “the offense of frequently exciting and 
stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise.” Barratry, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
954 (6th ed. 1990). For a discussion of barratry in a family law context, see Bidna v. Rosen, 23 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 251, 259 (Ct. App. 1993) (Crosby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 188. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “maintenance” with respect to lawsuits as “an officious 
intermeddling in a lawsuit . . . or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or 
defend the litigation.” Maintenance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 954 (6th ed. 1990). For a 
general discussion of barratry and “maintenance,” see Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress: Third-
Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571 (2010). 
 189. See supra notes 6168 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children 
and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79 (1997) (describing the “inherent conflicts” 
between the “adversarial process” and the “‘best interest’ goal”). 
 191. See Pellman, Jacobs, & Reiner, supra note 9, at 8898 (arguing that children do have 
constitutionally protected interests in safe, secure and sufficient parenting, citing cases including 
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that “to the 
extent [that] parents and families have fundamental liberty interests . . . so, too, do children have 
these interests . . . .”)). 
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taxpayers.192 Fees from more affluent parents could be combined 
with county, court, and Judicial Council funds creatively and 
efficiently to do more for less affluent parents’ children. 
Family Code section 3153, unlike Family Code section 2030, 
presents very little risk of barratry or maintenance. To the contrary, 
“[c]hildren’s attorneys direct the parents’ focus back on their 
children, and away from disputes with each other.”193 The American 
Bar Association’s Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing 
Children in Custody Cases require children’s lawyers to “attempt to 
resolve [custody disputes] in the least adversarial manner 
possible.”194 
Furthermore, no law permits children’s lawyers to withdraw 
from a case before they finish the job the court appointed them to do. 
As has been demonstrated, children’s lawyers should arrange for a 
full range of necessary services195 while cutting litigation costs by 
reminding parents that their interests and their children’s interests are 
generally two sides of the same coin.196 
Construing section 3153 of the Family Code in In re Marriage 
of Metzger,197 California’s Second District Court of Appeal upheld 
an order requiring affluent parents to pay a $100,000 retainer to 
counsel appointed for their child about three months before trial. The 
 
 192. California Family Code section 3153 reads in full: 
If the court appoints counsel under this chapter to represent the child, counsel shall 
receive a reasonable sum for compensation and expenses, the amount of which shall be 
determined by the court. Except as provided in subdivision (b), this amount shall be 
paid by the parties in the proportions the court deems just. 
Upon its own motion or that of a party, the court shall determine whether both parties 
together are financially unable to pay all or a portion of the cost of counsel appointed 
pursuant to this chapter, and the portion of the cost of that counsel which the court 
finds the parties are unable to pay shall be paid by the county. The Judicial Council 
shall adopt guidelines to assist in determining financial eligibility for county payment 
of counsel appointed by the court pursuant to this chapter. 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3153 (2016). Rule 5.241(b) of the California Rules of Court and Standard 
5.10 of the Standards of Judicial Administration, entitled, “Guidelines for Determining Payment 
for Costs of Appointed Counsel for Children in Family Court,” identify factors and issues for the 
court to consider in deciding whether to make such an order. 
 193. See Josanna Berkow, Court Appointed Attorneys for Children, 1 J. CTR. CHILD. & CTS. 
131 (1999). 
 194. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Family Law, Standards of Practice for Lawyers 
Representing Children in Custody Cases, 37 FAM. L.Q. 131 (2003) (also stating that a child’s 
lawyer should “[p]articipate in, and, when appropriate, initiate negotiations and mediation.”). 
 195. Id. at 136. 
 196. See In re Angelia P., 623 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1981) (“In general, children’s needs are best 
met by helping parents achieve their interests.”). 
 197. In re Marriage of Metzger, 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382 (Ct. App. 2014). 
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court explained that the parents could not agree whether their child 
had “special needs,” and “counsel was needed to provide an unbiased 
perspective.”198 
To put this sum in perspective, Los Angeles County’s probate 
court has established a prima facie billing limit of $1,500 for lawyers 
who represent poor children in guardianship-of-the-person cases.199 
At almost sixty-seven times the probate court’s prima facie billing 
limit, the Metzger award might be enough to appoint lawyers for 
poor children in almost 67 guardianship cases.200 Like the Metzger 
case, many poor families’ cases involve children with special needs. 
Poverty, moreover, can interact with special needs in the way that an 
accelerant interacts with combustible materials.201 Yet many courts 
never appoint counsel for poor kids, regardless of those kids’ needs. 
Too many courts do nothing at all for them.202 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As we all know, every child is unique. But the cases discussed in 
this article suggest that all children have the same goals when 
custody is at issue: to be safe, healthy, and happy; to get what they 
need to make the most of themselves; and to have the best possible 
relationship with both parents. 
 
 198. Id. at 389. Many of the children at the center of the cases studied in this Article 
unquestionably have “special needs.” Many are also poor, which compounds their needs. See 
supra notes 97, 147, 149; infra notes 202203. 
 199. See General Order Re: Probate Volunteer Panel Appointments at 3 (L.A. Super. Ct. 
May 2, 2015), http://www.lacourt.org/division/probate/pdf/GenOrderRePVPAppts.pdf. 
 200. The adequacy vel non of this prima facie limit is beyond the scope of this Article. Low 
fees virtually entail large caseloads, however, which may help explain why the lawyers and social 
workers accomplished nothing positive for their client in Aaron H.’s dependency case. See Am. 
Bar Ass’n, supra note 194, at 159 (exhorting courts to “control the size of court-appointed 
caseloads, so that lawyers do not have so many cases that they are unable to meet [the ABA’s] 
Standards”). 
 201. See supra notes 97, 147, 149; see also Glenn Flores & Bruce Lesley, Children and U.S. 
Federal Policy on Health and Health Care: Seen but Not Heard, 168 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1155 
(2014) (noting that child poverty in America was at its highest point in 20 years, and concluding 
that as a result, millions of children were at increased risk of injuries, infant mortality, and 
premature death); Joan Luby et al., The Effects of Poverty on Childhood Brain Development: The 
Mediating Effect of Caregiving and Stressful Life Events, 167 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1135 (2013) 
(providing data on the mechanisms by which poverty can negatively impact childhood brain 
development). 
 202. See supra notes 59, 20, 32, 49, 169 and accompanying text. Two family law journals 
have published special issues expressing concern about the ways that family courts across the 
country address “special needs children.” Symposium on Special Needs and Disability in Family 
Law, 46 FAM. L.Q. 177, 177311 (2012); Donald T. Saposnek et al., Special Needs Children in 
Family Court Cases, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 566 (2005). 
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This Article also shows that some children need lawyers to have 
any chance at all to get what they need in court. Children’s advocates 
must do more than go through the motions, since kabuki 
representation accomplishes nothing. When necessary, children’s 
lawyers should work with other professionals to incorporate 
generally accepted social science principles into multi-disciplinary 
representation. Children’s lawyers should also work with relatives, 
churches, and other community groups to make better use of existing 
resources. 
Family court and probate court are Barmecide feasts for too 
many children, especially poor children with special needs. When 
they fail to adjudicate the salient issues in children’s cases, courts 
engage in what Judge Henry Friendly called “nonadjudication” or 
“evisceration and tergiversation.”203 Existing law makes it possible 
for the courts to do better. For a small fraction of the money that 
family and probate courts now spend to accomplish next to nothing 
for the children who need help the most, the courts could make much 
more complete and better informed custody-and-visitation orders, 
dramatically improve parenting ability, turn D and F students into A 
and B students, put at-risk children on the road to success, and even 
save some kids’ lives. 
Since most children cannot identify the salient issues in their 
cases and generally do not have standing in family and probate court, 
much less lawyers to represent them,204 it becomes the court’s 
responsibility in every case to identify the issues relevant to 
children’s best interest205 and decide whether multidisciplinary 
representation is indispensable to justice.206 
 
 203. Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in 
BENCHMARKS: SELECTED PAPERS BY AN EMINENT FEDERAL JUDGE 210–12 (1967) (addressing 
rule of statutory construction enabling courts to avoid adjudication of constitutional issues). The 
case studies in this Article show how tergiversation enables courts to eviscerate children’s rights 
by avoiding adjudication of the issues that matter most to children involved in custody disputes. 
See supra note 4. 
 204. See supra notes 5, 8, 49, and 169. 
 205. Cf. Natalie Anne Knowlton, The Modern Family Court Judge: Knowledge, Qualities, 
and Skills for Success, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 203 (2015) (“Family court judges . . . must leverage . . . 
services . . . and coordinate with interdisciplinary professionals to ensure that services are 
adequately delivered.”). 
 206. This Article will not suggest a mechanism for family courts and probate courts to use to 
make this determination. Juvenile courts, however, conduct arraignment hearings in all 
dependency, delinquency, and termination-of-parental-rights cases to decide whether to appoint 
counsel for children. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 317(c), 727.31 (West 2016); id. § 633 (West 
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Given budgetary and political realities, trial courts should use 
triage principles to decide whether to appoint counsel for at-risk 
children at the center of custody disputes in family and probate court. 
This article shows that the following factors are relevant: 
1.   Child abuse or neglect, domestic violence, or substance 
abuse is alleged or reasonably suspected; 
2.   A parent seems incapable of meeting a child’s basic 
needs; 
3.   A parent or a child is reasonably suspected of gang 
activity; 
4.   A parent or a child has a significant criminal record; 
5.   The family is living in poverty, and the parents have no 
substantial connection to the labor force; 
6.   There is a family history of serious dysfunction; 
7.   A parent suffers from a disorder that affects parenting; 
8.   A child is failing in school, or has special physical, 
mental, or emotional needs; 
9.   There is intense conflict between the parents; and 
10.  A child requests counsel.207 
 
1961); CAL. R. CT. 5.534 (2016). These arraignments take several minutes, and cannot be 
expensive. Juvenile delinquency courts also offer a precedent for the use of questionnaires to 
identify relevant issues and facts. See In re Gladys R., 464 P.2d 127, 133 (Cal. 1970). 
 207. Steve Baron explained: 
In Santa Clara County, Family Court Services regularly requests appointment of an 
attorney for the children in cases where both parents appear to have parentally 
debilitating issues (i.e., serious substance abuse/dependency and/or domestic violence, 
child abuse, or neglect) and in which the child welfare department declines either to 
file a petition or to provide services. 
Baron, supra note 57, at 122. Rule 5.240(a) of the California Rules of Court lists the following 
factors for all trial courts to “take into account” when deciding whether to appoint counsel for a 
child in family court: 
(1)  The issues of child custody and visitation are highly contested or protracted; 
(2)  The child is subjected to stress as a result of the dispute that might be alleviated by 
the intervention of counsel representing the child; 
(3)  Counsel representing the child would be likely to provide the court with relevant 
information not otherwise readily available or likely to be presented; 
(4)  The dispute involves allegations of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or neglect 
of the child; 
(5)  It appears that one or both parents are incapable of providing a stable, safe, and 
secure environment; 
(6)  Counsel is available for appointment who is knowledgeable about the issues being 
raised regarding the child in the proceeding; 
(7)  The best interest of the child appears to require independent representation; and 
(8)  If there are two or more children, any child would require separate counsel to 
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Children, finally, receive no benefit from cronyism, and they are 
oblivious to the mere appearance of due process. They need real 
advocates who really will do as much as they possibly can to help 
them. To protect every child’s interests, to guard against careless 
decisions and cronyism, and to preserve public confidence in the 
appointment process, trial courts must exercise their discretion to 
appoint counsel on a case-by-case basis and create a record sufficient 
to enable appellate review.208 
 
 
avoid a conflict of interest. 
CAL. R. CT. 5.240(a)(1)–(8). This list has proven less than useful in practice, possibly because 
most contested matters present at least one of the specified criteria, and possibly because 
California Family Code section 3150 gives family courts discretion to refuse to appoint counsel in 
all cases, even when they find that all of these criteria are met. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3150 
(West 2016). 
 208. See supra note 10. 
